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HOLDINGS: [1]-In an appraisal proceeding pursuant to Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262, taken as a 
whole, the evidence established the existence of a significant valuation gap between the market 
price of the company's common stock and the intrinsic value of the company; the "anti-bubble" 
both facilitated a management buyout and undermined the reliability of the market price as a 
measure of the company's value; [2]-The final merger consideration was certainly a relevant 
factor, but it was not the best evidence of the company's fair value; [3]-Because it was 
impossible to quantify the exact degree of the sale process mispricing, the decision did not give 
weight to the final merger consideration, but used the DCF methodology exclusively to derive a 
fair value of the company; the fair value generated by the DCF methodology comported with the 




The fair value of the company on the closing date was determined to be $17.62 per share. The 
legal rate of interest, compounded quarterly, was to accrue on this amount from the date of 








• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
• Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Rights of Dissenting Shareholders 
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• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Remedies 
HN1   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
An appraisal proceeding is a limited legislative remedy intended to provide shareholders 
dissenting from a merger on grounds of inadequacy of the offering price with a judicial 
determination of the intrinsic worth (fair value) of their shareholdings. Section 262(h) of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law states that the court shall determine the fair value of the 
shares exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the 
merger or consolidation, together with interest, if any, to be paid upon the amount determined to 
be the fair value. In determining such fair value, the court shall take into account all relevant 
factors. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262(h). The statute thus places the obligation to determine the 
fair value of the shares squarely on the court. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > Corporations > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & 
Dissent Rights 
• Evidence > Burdens of Proof > Burdens of Production 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN2   Shareholder Actions, Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights 
Because of the statutory mandate of Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262(h), the allocation of the burden 
of proof in an appraisal proceeding differs from a liability proceeding. In a statutory appraisal 
proceeding, both sides have the burden of proving their respective valuation positions by a 
preponderance of evidence. No presumption, favorable or unfavorable, attaches to either side's 
valuation. Each party also bears the burden of proving the constituent elements of its valuation 
position by a preponderance of the evidence, including the propriety of a particular method, 
modification, discount, or premium. If both parties fail to meet the preponderance standard on 
the ultimate question of fair value, the court is required under the statute to make its own 
determination. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > Corporations > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & 
Dissent Rights 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
4 
 
HN3   Shareholder Actions, Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights 
In discharging its statutory mandate, under Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262(h), the Court of 
Chancery has discretion to select one of the parties' valuation models as its general framework or 
to fashion its own. The Court may evaluate the valuation opinions submitted by the parties, 
select the most representative analysis, and then make appropriate adjustments to the resulting 
valuation. The court also may make its own independent valuation calculation by adapting or 
blending the factual assumptions of the parties' experts. It is also entirely proper for the Court of 
Chancery to adopt any one expert's model, methodology, and mathematical calculations, in toto, 
if that valuation is supported by credible evidence and withstands a critical judicial analysis on 
the record. When none of the parties establishes a valuation that is persuasive, the Court must 
make a determination based on its own analysis. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
• Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Rights of Dissenting Shareholders 
HN4   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
The concept of fair value under Delaware law is not equivalent to the economic concept of fair 
market value. Rather, the concept of fair value for purposes of Delaware's appraisal statute is a 
largely judge-made creation, freighted with policy considerations. The Delaware Supreme Court 
has explained in detail the concept of value that the appraisal statute employs: The basic concept 
of value under the appraisal statute is that the stockholder is entitled to be paid for that which has 
been taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest in a going concern. By value of the 
stockholder's proportionate interest in the corporate enterprise is meant the true or intrinsic value 
of his stock which has been taken by the merger. In determining what figure represents the true 
or intrinsic value, courts must take into consideration all factors and elements which reasonably 
might enter into the fixing of value. Thus, market value, asset value, dividends, earning 
prospects, the nature of the enterprise and any other facts which were known or which could be 
ascertained as of the date of the merger and which throw any light on future prospects of the 
merged corporation are not only pertinent to an inquiry as to the value of the dissenting 
stockholder's interest, but must be considered. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
• Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Rights of Dissenting Shareholders 
HN5   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
The time for determining the value of a dissenter's shares is the point just before the merger 
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transaction on the date of the merger. Put differently, the valuation date is the date on which the 
merger closes. Consequently, if the value of the corporation changes between the signing of the 
merger and the closing, the fair value determination must be measured by the operative reality of 
the corporation at the effective time of the merger. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN6   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
The statutory obligation to make a single determination of a corporation's value introduces an 
impression of false precision into appraisal jurisprudence. The value of a corporation is not a 
point on a line, but a range of reasonable values, and the judge's task is to assign one particular 
value within this range as the most reasonable value in light of all the relevant evidence and 
based on considerations of fairness. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN7   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
If there is an established market for shares of a corporation the market value of such shares must 
be taken into consideration in an appraisal of their intrinsic value. It is, of course, equally 
axiomatic that market value, either actual or constructed, is not the sole element to be taken into 
consideration in the appraisal of stock. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
• Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Rights of Dissenting Shareholders 
HN8   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
If a merger giving rise to appraisal rights resulted from an arm's-length process between two 
independent parties, and if no structural impediments existed that might materially distort the 
crucible of objective market reality, then a reviewing court should give substantial evidentiary 
weight to the merger price as an indicator of fair value. More like this Headnote 
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Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN9   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
The Delaware Supreme Court has eschewed market fundamentalism by making clear that market 
price data is neither conclusively determinative of nor presumptively equivalent to fair value. 
More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN10   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262(h) neither dictates nor even contemplates that the Court of Chancery 
should consider the transactional market price of the underlying company. Rather, in determining 
"fair value," the statute instructs that the court shall take into account all relevant factors. 
Importantly, the Court has defined "fair value" as the value to a stockholder of the firm as a 
going concern, as opposed to the firm's value in the context of an acquisition or other transaction. 
Determining fair value through all relevant factors may be an imperfect process, but the General 
Assembly has determined it to be an appropriately fair process. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
• Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Rights of Dissenting Shareholders 
HN11   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262(h) unambiguously calls upon the Court of Chancery to perform an 
independent evaluation of "fair value" at the time of a transaction. It vests the Chancellor and 
Vice Chancellors with significant discretion to consider all relevant favors and determine the 
going concern value of the underlying company. Requiring the Court of Chancery to defer—
conclusively or presumptively—to the merger price, even in the face of a pristine, unchallenged 
transactional process, would contravene the unambiguous language of the statute and the 
reasoned holdings of precedent. It would inappropriately shift the responsibility to determine fair 
value from the court to the private parties. Also, while it is difficult for the Chancellor and Vice 
Chancellors to assess wildly divergent expert opinions regarding value, inflexible rules 
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governing appraisal provide little additional benefit in determining fair value because of the 
already high costs of appraisal actions. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN12   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
The Court of Chancery of Delaware considers the deal price as one of the relevant factors when 
determining fair value, in the context of an appraisal. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN13   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
An important consideration when evaluating the persuasiveness of the deal price for establishing 
fair value is the nature of the court's review of the process that led to the transaction. More like 
this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
• Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Rights of Dissenting Shareholders 
• Business & Corporate Law > Corporations > Shareholder Actions 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Directors & Officers > Management Duties & 
Liabilities > Fiduciary Duties 
HN14   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
While the transaction particulars undergirding appraisal are related to and can sometimes overlap 
with those relevant to the fiduciary duty class action, the emphasis is crucially different. In a 
fiduciary duty class action, the court is faced with the question of holding individual directors 
personally liable for having breached their duties to the stockholders. Courts are naturally and 
properly hesitant to take such a drastic step lest directors become risk-averse, making decisions 
with an eye toward minimizing the risk of personal liability rather than seeking to maximize 
expected value for stockholders. An appraisal action asks a substantially more modest question: 
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did the stockholders get fair value for their shares in the merger? If not, the acquirer must make 
up the difference, but no one is held personally liable. The two inquiries are different, so a sale 
process might pass muster for purposes of a breach of fiduciary claim and yet still generate a 
sub-optimal process for purposes of an appraisal. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Causes of Action & Remedies > Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty > Burdens of Proof 
• Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Duties & Liabilities of Directors & Officers 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Causes of Action & Remedies > Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty > Elements 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Directors & Officers > Management Duties & 
Liabilities > Causes of Action 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Management Duties & Liabilities > Fiduciary 
Duties > Business Judgment Rule 
HN15   Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Burdens of Proof 
The central question in a breach of fiduciary duty case is whether the defendant fiduciaries acted 
in a manner that should subject them personally to a damages award. To determine whether a 
breach of duty occurred, a court applying Delaware law evaluates the directors' conduct through 
the lens of a standard of review. Delaware has three tiers of review for evaluating director 
decision-making: the business judgment rule, enhanced scrutiny, and entire fairness. Enhanced 
scrutiny is Delaware's intermediate standard of review. Framed for purposes of an M&A 
transaction, enhanced scrutiny places the burden on the defendant directors to show that they 
sought to secure the transaction offering the best value reasonably available for the stockholders. 
In this formulation, the key verb is "sought." Time-bound mortals cannot foresee the future. The 
test therefore cannot be whether, with hindsight, the directors actually achieved the best price. 
Rather, the duty can only be to try in good faith, in such a setting, to get the best available 
transaction for the shareholders. Directors are not insurers. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Duties & Liabilities of Directors & Officers 
HN16   Mergers, Duties & Liabilities of Directors & Officers 
To determine whether directors have satisfied their fiduciary duties in an M&A setting, the 
enhanced scrutiny standard of review examines (i) the reasonableness of the decisionmaking 
process employed by the directors, including the information on which the directors based their 
decision, and (ii) the reasonableness of the directors' action in light of the circumstances then 
existing. Through this examination, the court seeks to assure itself that the board acted 
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reasonably, in the sense of taking a logical and reasoned approach for the purpose of advancing a 
proper objective, and to thereby smoke out mere pretextual justifications for improperly 
motivated decisions. The reasonableness standard enables a reviewing court to address 
inequitable action even when directors may have subjectively believed that they were acting 
properly. The objective standard does not permit a reviewing court to freely substitute its own 
judgment for the directors. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Management Duties & Liabilities > Fiduciary 
Duties > Business Judgment Rule 
• Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Duties & Liabilities of Directors & Officers 
• Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Rights of Dissenting Shareholders 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Management Duties & Liabilities > Fiduciary 
Duties > Duty of Good Faith 
HN17   Fiduciary Duties, Business Judgment Rule 
In the M&A context, there are many business and financial considerations implicated in 
investigating and selecting the best value reasonably available. The board of directors is the 
corporate decisionmaking body best equipped to make these judgments. Accordingly, a court 
applying enhanced judicial scrutiny should be deciding whether the directors made a reasonable 
decision, not a perfect decision. If a board selected one of several reasonable alternatives, a court 
should not second-guess that choice even though it might have decided otherwise or subsequent 
events may have cast doubt on the board's determination. Thus, courts will not substitute their 
business judgment for that of the directors, but will determine if the directors' decision was, on 
balance, within a range of reasonableness. Enhanced scrutiny is not a license for law-trained 
courts to second-guess reasonable, but debatable, tactical choices that directors have made in 
good faith. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Directors & Officers > Management Duties & 
Liabilities > Causes of Action 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Directors & Officers > Management Duties & 
Liabilities > Fiduciary Duties 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Causes of Action & Remedies > Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty > Elements 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Management Duties & Liabilities > Causes of 
Action > Self-Dealing 
10 
 
HN18   Management Duties & Liabilities, Causes of Action 
Enhanced scrutiny requires an inquiry into the ends corporate directors pursued and the means 
they chose to achieve them. The reasonableness standard requires the court to consider for itself 
whether the board is truly well motivated (i.e. is it acting for the proper ends?) before ultimately 
determining whether its means were themselves a reasonable way of advancing those ends. 
Enhanced scrutiny mandates that the court look closely at the motivations of the board. What 
typically generates a finding of breach is evidence of self-interest, undue favoritism or disdain 
towards a particular bidder, or a similar non-stockholder-motivated influence that calls into 
question the integrity of the process. The test is not whether the outcome was in fact the best 
transaction reasonably available, and the failure to achieve what actually would have been the 
best transactional outcome, standing alone, is not a basis for liability. The outcome that the 
directors achieved will figure into the damages calculation, but only if the matter reaches that 
phase. The outcome is not part of the liability case. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
• Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Duties & Liabilities of Directors & Officers 
HN19   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
In an appraisal proceeding, the court does not judge the directors' motives or the reasonableness 
of their actions, but rather the outcome they achieved. The price is all that matters because the 
court's inquiry focuses exclusively on the value of the company. How and why the directors 
achieved fair value or fell short is not part of the case. The sale process is useful to the extent—
and only to the extent—that it provides evidence of the company's value on the date the merger 
closed. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Duties & Liabilities > Causes of Action & 
Remedies > Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Directors & Officers > Management Duties & 
Liabilities > Causes of Action 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Directors & Officers > Management Duties & 
Liabilities > Fiduciary Duties 
HN20   Causes of Action & Remedies, Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
Because the standards differ for breach of fiduciary duty and appraisal proceedings, it is entirely 
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possible that the decisions made during a sale process could fall within Revlon's range of 
reasonableness, and yet the process still could generate a price that was not persuasive evidence 
of fair value in an appraisal. Put differently, even if a transaction passes fiduciary muster, an 
appraisal proceeding could result in a higher fair value award. To be sure, the questions in the 
two kinds of actions are frequently related. Often, when stockholders do not get fair value for 
their shares, it will be because the board has breached its fiduciary duties. The strongest appraisal 
claims should also present strong fiduciary duty claims, and vice versa. But forcing both types of 
claims into the same analytical box is a self-evident mistake. Many types of managerial sloth, 
incompetence, pressure, or collusion that courts have been understandably hesitant to 
characterize as breaches of fiduciary duty can nonetheless lead to stockholders receiving well 
below fair value for their shares. In such situations, appraisal constitutes a useful middle course 
between holding directors personally liable (and potentially granting injunctions) and allowing 
unfair transactions to escape meaningful scrutiny. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN21   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
Satisfying one of the various Revlon-type tests is not necessarily a market test sufficient to 
establish fair value for purposes of appraisal. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
• Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Rights of Dissenting Shareholders 
HN22   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
Delaware case law recognizes that the highest price a bidder is willing to pay is not the same as 
fair value. Although the Delaware Supreme Court has recognized that a merger price resulting 
from arms-length negotiations is a very strong indication of fair value, it has also cautioned that 
the merger price must be accompanied by evidence tending to show that it represents the going 
concern value of the company rather than just the value of the company to one specific buyer. 
The fact that a board has extracted the most that a particular buyer (or type of buyer) will pay 
does not mean that the result constitutes fair value. More like this Headnote 





• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
• Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Rights of Dissenting Shareholders 
HN23   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
The Delaware Supreme Court has acknowledged that an appraisal proceeding can and should 
address the problem of opportunistic timing. The determination of fair value must be based on all 
relevant factors, including damages and elements of future value, where appropriate. So, for 
example, if a merger was timed to take advantage of a depressed market, or a low point in the 
company's cyclical earnings, or to precede an anticipated positive development, the appraised 
value may be adjusted to account for those factors. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN24   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
The DCF analysis is a well-established method of determining the going concern value of a 
corporation. The DCF methodology has featured prominently in the Court of Chancery of 
Delaware because it is the approach that merits the greatest confidence within the financial 
community. Put in very simple terms, the basic DCF method involves several discrete steps. 
First, one estimates the values of future cash flows for a discrete period. Then, the value of the 
entity attributable to cash flows expected after the end of the discrete period must be estimated to 
produce a so-called terminal value, preferably using a perpetual growth model. Finally, the value 
of the cash flows for the discrete period and the terminal value must be discounted back. More 
like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN25   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
The Court of Chancery of Delaware has expressed a preference for valuations based on 
contemporaneously prepared management projections. Generally speaking, the Court's appraisal 
jurisprudence is skeptical of litigation-driven adjustments to management projections. More 
like this Headnote 





• Banking Law > ... > Criminal Offenses > Bank Fraud > Elements 
HN26   Bank Fraud, Elements 
It is a federal felony to knowingly obtain any funds from a financial institution by false or 
fraudulent pretenses or representations, which enhances the credibility of a set of projections that 
is provided to a financial institution. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1344 (2006)). More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN27   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
The rate of inflation is the floor for a terminal value estimate for a solidly profitable company 
that does not have an identifiable risk of insolvency. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN28   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
In determining fair value, the court cannot consider speculative tax liabilities. More like this 
Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
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LASTER, Vice Chancellor. 
The petitioners owned shares of common stock of Dell Inc. (the "Company"). In 2013, the 
Company completed a merger that gave rise to appraisal rights (the "Merger"). The petitioners 
sought appraisal. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the fair value of the Company's 
common stock at the effective time of the Merger was $17.62 per share. 
 
 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Trial took place over four days. The parties introduced over 1,200 exhibits and lodged seventeen 
depositions. Seven fact witnesses and five experts testified live. The laudably thorough pre-trial 
order contained 542 paragraphs. The pre-trial and post-trial briefing totaled 369 pages. 
 
 
A. [*2]  An Evolving Company 
In 1983, at the age of nineteen, Michael Dell started the Company in his freshman dorm room at 
the University of Texas at Austin. Within two years, the Company achieved annual sales of more 
than $40 million. On June 22, 1988, the Company went public. 
Over time, the Company expanded its operations to include sales of PCs, servers, and storage 
devices to both consumers and businesses. Mr. Dell1  remained at the helm of the Company 
until 2004. He rejoined the Company in 2007. 
After returning, Mr. Dell came to believe that the Company needed to evolve to meet 
competitive threats. One threat came from the low-margin producers. The Company sold 
primarily high-margin, premium-priced PCs. That market was shrinking as advances in 
technology enabled cheaper computers to provide better performance. Competitors were 
capturing market share by selling cheaper PCs [*3]  at low margins. 
Another threat was from new products. In 2007, Apple Inc. introduced the iPhone. In 2010, 
Apple introduced the iPad. Consumers embraced smartphones and tablets. Both ate into the 
traditional PC market. 
A third threat affected the Company's server business. In 2007, Amazon.com, Inc. introduced a 
cloud-based storage service. The Company sold servers to companies that maintained their own 
technology infrastructure, and the cloud eliminated that need. 
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Mr. Dell believed that the Company needed to reduce its reliance on PC sales to end users and 
increase its sales of software and services to enterprise customers. In 2009, the Company started 
its transformation, which Mr. Dell planned to achieve through acquisitions. 
Between 2010 and 2012, the Company spent approximately $14 billion to acquire eleven 
businesses. Mr. Dell believed that with these acquisitions, the Company's transformation was 
complete, although it would take time to integrate the new businesses and for them to perform in 
accordance with his expectations. Mr. Dell and his management team were confident that the 
newly assembled enterprise division would bear fruit, and they also believed that the Company 
would continue [*4]  to grow its PC business at a rate of 1-2% annually. In a sum-of-the-parts 
analysis prepared in January 2011, they valued the Company at $22.49 per share (by line of 
business) and $27.05 per share (by business unit). 
 
 
B. The Company's Market Price Implies A Different View. 
Management's internal valuations were significantly higher than the market price of the 
Company's stock, which traded around $14 per share during the same period. Mr. Dell lamented 
that the market just "didn't get" the Company. Tr. 409 (Mr. Dell). He thought that in spite of the 
Company's transformation, "Dell [was] still seen as a PC business." JX 44 at 1. 
Mr. Dell conferred with his management team and hired consultants to devise strategies to help 
the market view the Company as "a sum of the parts." JX 46 at 1. Mr. Dell regularly 
communicated his views to analysts. During a meeting with analysts on June 12 and 13, 2012, 
management called for a strong performance from the enterprise solutions and services division, 
projecting that it would account for 60% of the Company's profits by 2016. Management 
anticipated 12% annual growth in software sales and 22% growth in services revenue. At the 
same time, management projected [*5]  that the Company's end-user computing division would 
grow at a rate of 2% to 5% annually, and that even if end-user computing experienced a 
downside scenario of 5% negative growth annually, earnings and operating income from that 
division still would increase. Management also announced a $2 billion costs savings initiative. 
Management's optimism contrasted with the Company's recent performance. Earnings for the 
first quarter of FY 2013 were down 22% year over year and below analysts' expectations. U.S. 
revenues declined for a fifth straight quarter. Revenues from developing markets remained flat. 
Market observers expressed doubt about management's projections. An analyst from Goldman 
Sachs opined that "Dell's guidance is likely too aggressive on both the revenue and margin 
perspectives." JX 90 at 5. An analyst from Bernstein Research questioned the cost-saving 
initiative, observing that "historically . . . Dell's cost cutting programs have been difficult to 
monitor, with no clear delineation between component cost declines/other industry wide benefits 
vs. Dell specific take-outs." JX 92 at 2. An analyst from Indigo Equity Research remarked that 
the cost savings initiative "sound[ed] good," but [*6]  was "unlikely to succeed well due to the 
execution hurdles." JX 115 at 8. 
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The Company's market price suggested that the marginal purchaser shared the analysts' 
skepticism. During the first half of 2012, the Company's stock declined from a high of around 
$18 per share to approximately $12 per share. 
 
 
C. Mr. Dell Decides To Propose An MBO. 
In June 2012, Staley Cates from Southeastern Asset Management asked Mr. Dell whether he 
would consider a management buyout ("MBO"). In August, Egon Durban of Silver Lake 
approached Mr. Dell with the same idea. Mr. Dell decided to consider it. On August 11 and 
again on August 13, Mr. Dell met with his friend George Roberts of Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & 
Co. L.P. ("KKR") about whether an MBO made sense. Roberts said he would look into it, and 
that if the numbers worked out, then KKR would want to participate. 
The numbers worked out. On Friday August 14, 2012, Mr. Dell called Alex Mandl, the 
Company's lead independent director, and reported on his conversations with Southeastern, 
Silver Lake, and KKR. He told Mandl that he wanted to pursue an MBO. The Company's stock 
closed at $12.19 that day. 
The Company's board of directors (the "Board") met the following Monday. [*7]  Mr. Dell told 
the directors that he "did not want to proceed further without approval of the Board, and that he 
would not engage a financial advisor without first informing the Board." JX 106 at 1. After Mr. 
Dell left the meeting, the Board discussed establishing a special committee. 
After the meeting, Mandl told Mr. Dell that the Board would consider an MBO. Mr. Dell passed 
on the news to Silver Lake and KKR. He did not contact Southeastern. 
On August 20, 2012, the Board met by telephone. Mr. Dell did not attend. During the meeting, 
the Board formed a special committee (the "Committee") and granted to it 
the full and exclusive power and authority of the Board to the fullest extent permitted by law . . . 
to take any action in connection with [any potential transaction involving Mr. Dell or any other 
strategic alternative that may be considered by the Board] which the Committee determines in its 
sole discretion to be advisable. 
JX 107 at 3-4. The resolutions provided that the Board would not recommend any transaction 
without a prior favorable recommendation from the Committee. 
The members of the Committee were Mandl, Laura Conigliaro, Janet F. Clark, and Kenneth M. 
Duberstein. In addition [*8]  to being the Company's lead independent director, Mandl was a 
successful businessman with experience on other Fortune 100 boards. Conigliaro was a partner at 
Goldman Sachs who had covered the tech industry as a senior analyst. Clark was a former CFO 
of Marathon Oil Corporation with extensive board experience. Duberstein had been the lead 
independent director at Boeing, served on other major boards, and was the White House Chief of 
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Staff to President Ronald Reagan. None of the members of the Committee had any financial or 
business ties to Mr. Dell other than their board service. 
The Board authorized the Committee to hire its own advisors. The Committee retained 
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP as its legal counsel and hired JPMorgan Chase & Co. as its financial 
advisor. 
On August 30, 2012, the Board adopted resolutions that expanded the scope of the Committee's 
authority. Under the new resolutions, the Committee enjoyed the 
full and exclusive power and authority of the Board to the fullest extent permitted by law to 
(1) review and to evaluate the terms and conditions, and determine the advisability, of a 
Proposed Transaction and any alternatives thereto that the Special Committee deems 
appropriate, [*9]  
(2) establish, approve, modify, monitor and direct the process and procedures related to the 
review and evaluation of a Proposed Transaction and any alternatives thereto, including, but not 
limited to, the authority to determine not to proceed with any such process, procedures, review or 
evaluation, or to recommend any of the foregoing to the Board, 
(3) solicit expressions of interest or other proposals for any strategic alternatives that may be 
considered by the [Committee], 
(4) negotiate with Mr. Dell or any other party that the [Committee] deems appropriate with 
respect to the terms and conditions of a Proposed Transaction or any alternative thereto and, if 
the [Committee] deems appropriate, but subject to the limitations of applicable law, approve the 
execution and delivery of documents in connection with a Proposed Transaction or any 
alternative transaction on behalf of the Corporation, 
(5) determine whether a Proposed Transaction or any alternative thereto negotiated by the 
[Committee] is fair to, and in the best interests of, the Corporation and its stockholders, 
(6) with respect to any actions required to be taken by the full Board with respect to a Proposed 
Transaction or any alternative [*10]  thereto, recommend to the full Board what action, if any, 
should be taken by the Board, 
(7) declare a dividend or authorize the issuance of stock of the Company and 
(8) take any other action which the [Committee] determines in its sole discretion to be advisable . 
. . . 
JX 123 at 3-4 (formatting added). 
 
 
D. The Company's Performance For The Second Quarter Of FY 2013 
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The day after the Board formed the Committee, the Company held its earnings call for the 
second quarter of FY 2013. Compared to the prior year, revenue declined by 8%, and earnings 
per share fell by 13%. The earnings result was consistent with analyst forecasts, but revenue was 
below expectations. Management forecasted further short-term declines, including a 20% 
downward revision for earnings per share in FY 2013, but stressed that the Company was 
following "a long-term strategy [that] will take time." JX 109 at 7. Mr. Dell explained, "We're 
transforming our business, not for a quarter or a fiscal year, but to deliver differentiated customer 
value for the long term." JX 110 at 1. 
After the call, many analysts decreased their price targets. An analyst from Indigo Equity 
Research described the Company as a "sinking ship" and stated [*11]  that "Dell's turnaround 
strategy is fundamentally flawed [and] the fundamentals are bad. Dell may have responded too 
late to save itself." JX 115 at 1. An analyst from Sterne Agee said that the "bottom line is that the 




E. The Committee Starts Its Process. 
During the first week of September 2012, the Committee entered into confidentiality agreements 
with Silver Lake, KKR, and Mr. Dell. The Committee did not contact Southeastern. 
Silver Lake's and KKR's confidentiality agreements included language that prevented them, for a 
period of eighteen months, from doing any of the following, directly or indirectly: 
(i) propos[ing] any business combination, acquisition or other extraordinary transaction 
involving the Company, its securities or any substantial part of its assets, or acquir[ing] or 
agree[ing] to acquire any equity securities of the Company, 
(ii) seek[ing] or propos[ing] to influence or control, through a proxy solicitation or otherwise, the 
board of directors, management or policies of the Company, or attempting to influence or control 
the Board, management, or policies of the Company, or 
(iii) mak[ing] any public disclosure, or tak[ing] any action, including [*12]  requesting a waiver 
or modification of any provision of this paragraph, that could reasonably be expected to require 
the Company to make any public disclosure with regard to any of the foregoing actions. 
JX 129; JX 130 (formatting added). 
Mr. Dell's confidentiality agreement contained similar restrictions plus additional obligations. 
Among other things, it prohibited him from 
• working with any person or entity with respect to a possible transaction other than Silver Lake 
or KKR, unless approved in advance in writing by the Company; 
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• talking to any sources of debt financing without the prior approval of the Company, and 
• taking any action that would prevent him from working with any potential counterparty or 
financing source in connection with a transaction or alternative transaction. 
JX 125 at 2. The agreement provided affirmatively that "You [Mr. Dell] agree to explore in good 
faith the possibility of working with any such potential counterparty or financing source if 
requested by the Committee; it being understood that your decision as to whether to work with 
any counterparty or financing source after such good faith exploration shall be within your 
discretion." Id. 
On September 13, [*13]  2012, management provided the Committee with their best estimate for 
the Company's future performance. Mr. Dell told the Board to "[e]xpect [the] short term to be 
very challenging" and that achieving the full benefits of the Company's transformation would 
require "sacrific[ing] short term results." JX 96 at 2. The Company's CFO, Brian Gladden, 
reviewed financial projections that management previously presented to the Board in July 2012 
(the "July Case"). 
The July Case supported valuations for the Company that were significantly higher than the 
Company's stock price. As part of the July presentation, management had used the July Case to 
estimate the Company's value as a stand-alone entity. Management advised the Board that: 
Industry revenue multiples implies enterprise value of $40B at the end of FY 12 
— Valuation discount of ~$25B driven by execution/transformation "doubts" 
Implied enterprise value should increase by over 50% to almost ~ $70B 
— ~$12B driven by portfolio mix shift 
— ~$16B driven by higher revenue 
JX 97 at 16. Put differently, management thought the Company was worth approximately $25 
billion more than its then-current market capitalization of approximately $15 billion. 
Management noted that projecting [*14]  the Company's past twelve months of free cash flow 
into perpetuity would produce a share price of greater than $30, meaning the market price 
implied that the Company would experience declines in free cash flow of 20% per year into 
perpetuity. 
The Committee members regarded the July Case as "very optimistic" and even "unrealistic." Tr. 
147 (Mandl). During the September meeting, the Committee told Gladden to modify the July 
Case further to take into account a report on the PC industry issued by analysts at the 
International Data Corporation ("IDC"). The IDC report contained a relatively pessimistic 
forecast for PC sales over the next five years. Contemporaneous analyst reports expressed more 
pointed skepticism about the Company's prospects.2  
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On September 14, 2012, the Committee received a presentation from JPMorgan about the 
transaction process. JPMorgan [*15]  noted that the Company's "[s]tock price has declined ~25% 
over the last year while the NASDAQ is up ~25%," and that "[m]issed Street expectations have 
put investors in a 'wait and see mode' with increased focus on quarter-by-quarter execution and 
improved visibility." JX 137 at 7. JPMorgan next conveyed its views about the feasibility of an 
MBO in light of "the basic math by which financial sponsors determine what they are willing to 
pay in an acquisition transaction," Mr. Dell's ownership of 15.4% of the Company's outstanding 
shares, and the Company's ability to keep in place after a transaction approximately $5.9 billion 
of existing debt. JX 136 at 2. The Company's ability to keep approximately 65% of its debt in 
place "materially reduc[ed] the debt commitments and inherent cost of capital" for a leveraged 
transaction. JX 137 at 23. 
JPMorgan provided the following highlights about a leveraged buyout ("LBO") structure: 
• "In an LBO transaction an acquirer ('financial buyer' or 'sponsor') purchases a company with a 
relatively small amount of equity and significant use of debt"; 
• "Sponsors seek to generate returns on their equity investment and use financial leverage to 
increase potential returns"; 
• "A sponsor [*16]  typically would expect to realize a return within 3 to 5 years via an outright 
sale, public offering or recapitalization"; 
• "Financial buyers evaluate investments with an internal rate of return (IRR) analysis, which 
measures return on equity"; 
• "Multiple of cash invested (e.g. 2.0x) is also a key parameter, particularly for larger 
transactions"; 
• "IRR will be used as the primary means to determine the appropriate purchase price by a 
sponsor . . . ." 
JX 137 at 21. 
JPMorgan also reviewed with the Committee the likelihood of interest from other financial 
sponsors or strategic bidders. The JPMorgan representatives "noted their belief that KKR and 
Silver Lake were among the best qualified potential acquirers." JX 136 at 3. They also stated that 
"there was a low probability of strategic buyer interest in acquiring the Company." Id. They 
nevertheless warned that limiting negotiations to KKR and Silver Lake would create a "[l]ack of 
competition." JX 137 at 35. 
JPMorgan "recommended a process by which KKR and Silver Lake would be given information 
and an opportunity to make an acquisition proposal[, and the] Committee could then decide how 
to proceed, including by terminating the process or inviting [*17]  other potential buyers to 
participate in the process." JX 136 at 3. After receiving JPMorgan's advice, the Committee 
decided to "refrain from contacting other sponsor groups until an offer was received [from Mr. 
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Dell and either KKR or Silver Lake] or subsequent events or analysis counseled a different 
course." Id. 
On September 17, 2012, and again on September 21, the Committee reconvened to review 
management's forecasts. Gladden presented revised projections that adjusted for the Company's 
performance to date, assumed lower customer demand, and reduced margins (the "September 
Case"). The Committee viewed the September Case as "more realistic" than the July Case but 
still "overly optimistic." Tr. 147 (Mandl). The Committee nevertheless authorized the September 
Case to be included in the online data room for use by Silver Lake and KKR in evaluating the 
Company. On October 9, 2012, the Committee received a presentation from JPMorgan that 
provided a preliminary assessment of the Company's value as a standalone entity. The 
Company's share price had closed the previous day at $9.66. JPMorgan derived the following 
valuation indications for the Company: 
• DCF using the September Case: $20.00 [*18]  to $27.00 per share. 
• DCF using Street high case: $19.25 to $25.75 per share. 
• DCF using Street consensus case: $15.25 to $19.25 per share. 
• DCF using Street low case: $9.50 to $11.50 per share. 
• Discounted equity value assuming price/earnings multiples in FY 2014-15 of 4.0x to 7.0x: 
$7.00 to $13.50 per share. 
• Trading multiples price/earnings multiples of 4.0x to 7.0x and consensus EPS of $1.79 per 
share: $7.25 to $13.00 per share. 
• Analyst price targets of $9.00 to $18.50 per share. 
• 52-week trading range of $9.43 to $18.32 per share. 
JX 162 at 15. 
JPMorgan also provided an analysis of what a financial buyer would be willing to pay based on 
an industry-standard LBO pricing model. Using the September Case and assuming that the buyer 
financed the transaction with 3.1x leverage, JPMorgan projected that a financial buyer could pay 
approximately $14.13 if it engaged in subsequent recapitalizations at the Company. At higher 
prices, the sponsor could not achieve a minimum five-year IRR of 20%. Assuming a financial 
sponsor wanted to achieve a range of IRRs of 20% to 25%, JPMorgan placed the likely valuation 
range at $11.75 to $13.00, or $13.25 to $14.25 if the sponsor engaged in further 
recapitalizations [*19]  of the Company. 
The next day, October 10, 2012, the Committee received a presentation from Goldman Sachs, 
which was "assisting the Company's management in preparing for the management presentations 
that had been made to financial sponsors." JX 166 at 1. Like JPMorgan, Goldman Sachs 
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presented an illustrative LBO analysis based on the September Case. Depending on the 
assumptions used, Goldman projected that a sponsor could pay approximately $16.00 per share 
and still generate a five-year IRR of 20%. 
On October 18, 2012, the Committee met again and received presentations from both JPMorgan 
and Goldman. Goldman provided possible reasons why the Company's stock price was 
disconnected from indications of the Company's fundamental value: 
• "[The Company's] current valuation is likely attributable to a range of potential factors 
including but not limited to: 
— Expectations of lower [Company] growth — both revenue and EPS 
— [PC business] segment financials overwhelming the financial contribution of other segments 
([PC business] represents ~50% of revenues) 
— Market outlook for the PC industry 
— Overhang from recent stock and operating underperformance"; 
• "Another reason for [the Company's] current [*20]  valuation could be because investors are 
not attributing full value to its significant cash balances"; 
• "Companies at the center of industries undergoing major structural changes often suffer from 
depressed valuations that seem 'disconnected' from fundamentals 
— Many investors believe that the shift to mobile computing represents a significant disruption 
to the traditional desktop and 'notebook' ecosystem 
— Investors are often reluctant to fight strong 'secular headwinds' even when values become 
attractive in absolute and relative terms; as a result, valuations can remain depressed for 
protracted periods." 
JX 170 at 6. Goldman observed that "[i]llustrative standalone valuation analyses result in 
[Company] value outcomes that are significantly higher than the current share price." Id. at 4. 
 
 
F. Silver Lake And KKR Provide Expressions Of Interest. 
On October 23, 2012, Silver Lake and KKR provided the Committee with expressions of 
interest. Silver Lake proposed an all-cash transaction valued at between $11.22 and $12.16 a 
share, excluding shares held by Mr. Dell. KKR proposed an all-cash transaction valued at 
between $12.00 and $13.00 a share, excluding shares held by Mr. Dell and Southeastern, and 
based its illustrative [*21]  analysis on a price of $12.50 per share. KKR's proposal also 
contemplated an additional $500 million investment by Mr. Dell. Dell's common stock closed at 
$9.35 that day. 
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The Committee reviewed the expressions of interest with the assistance of JPMorgan. The 20-
30% one-day premium from Silver Lake and the 28-39% one-day premium from KKR were in 
line with the premiums offered in other large LBOs within the last five years, but that was their 
only virtue. The ranges were far below all of JPMorgan's DCF analyses except the Street low 
case. They were at the low end of the valuations implied by JPMorgan's analysis of trading 
metrics. They even were below the prices suggested by JPMorgan and Goldman's LBO models, 
implying IRRs for the buyout groups significantly in excess of 20%. 
Mr. Dell had not been involved in determining the prices. He was content to participate at 
whatever pricing the financial sponsors obtained. At the Committee's request, Mr. Dell sent 
identical emails to Silver Lake and KKR in which he encouraged them to raise their valuations. 
He proposed a meeting between Company management and the sponsors and asked them a series 
of questions including "what factors could lead to [*22]  an improvement" in their proposals. JX 
194 at 1; JX 195 at 1. 
 
 
G. The Company's Performance For The Third Quarter Of 2012 
During November 2012, market observers became more critical of the Company. On November 
9, 2012, Citi Research Equities issued a report that set a price target of $8.50, described the 
outlook as "muted," and noted that "[i]n addition to our negative views on PCs, we believe [bring 
your own device] trends in the corporate PC segment will materially pressure Dell's sales, 
margins and EPS in the future." JX 1225 at 9. Mandl forwarded the report to the Committee, 
remarking that it provided "a very different outlook from what management has!!" JX 199 at 1. 
Conigliaro perceived "a potential need for us to consider a very conservative forecast, possibly 
even one that we once may have viewed as being close to 'worst case' in order for us to get ahead 
of the downward changes that we have been watching." Id. Separately, Gladden agreed that 
"[m]arket data has deteriorated" and that "many [peer] companies have announced weaker results 
and lower guidance." JX 180 at 2. He also recognized that "[m]anagement projections appear 
optimistic given valuation & sell-side estimates of Dell future value." Id. at 2. 
The [*23]  Committee decided to get external help from Boston Consulting Group, Inc. 
("BCG"). They tasked BCG with creating an independent set of forecasts for the Company. 
On November 15, 2012, the Company reported its financial results for the third quarter. Revenue 
and earnings per share came in below the Company's guidance and the Street consensus. 
Compared to the previous year, revenue was down 11%, and earnings per share were down 28%. 
At this point, the Company had come in below consensus estimates for revenue in six of the last 
seven quarters and below consensus estimates for earnings per share in three of the last seven 
quarters. 
Analysts cut their price targets, citing structural problems in the PC market and questions about 
the Company's transformation. JPMorgan noted, however, that there was also "[s]ignificant 
buying by long-only and value-oriented investors in the two weeks leading up to earnings." JX 





H. KKR Drops Out, And The Committee Contacts TPG. 
On December 3, 2012, KKR dropped out, saying that it could not "get [its] arms around the risks 
of the PC business." JX 224 at 1. KKR's investment committee had concluded that the 
Company's recent operating performance validated analysts' [*24]  concerns. 
The Committee was disappointed, because it now only had one sponsor in the process and 
therefore no direct source of pre-signing competition for Silver Lake. Mr. Dell reiterated to 
Mandl that he was willing "to join up with whoever," but he had not spoken with Southeastern 
since June. JX 224 at 1. Mr. Dell also told Mandl that he had the ability to supply as much equity 
capital as was needed to complete a transaction. 
On December 4, 2012, Silver Lake submitted a proposal to acquire the Company for $12.70 per 
share, up from its previous range of $11.22 to $12.16 per share. The Committee rejected the offer 
as inadequate. 
On December 5, 2012, the Committee received its first presentation from BCG. Like the 
Committee's financial advisors, BCG observed that the Company's low valuation did "not match 
apparent company strengths," but rather reflected "investor concerns." JX 344 at 42. BCG 
described the investors' concerns as either a belief that the Company's cash flows were "likely to 
decline rapidly" or a sense that the Company was using its cash flow in "value-destroying ways." 
Id. BCG thought that the more likely explanation was a fear of rapidly declining cash flows. 
After hearing [*25]  from BCG, the Committee heard from JPMorgan. Its representatives agreed 
that investors seemed focused on the Company's short-term results at the expense of its long-
term value, commenting that "[l]imited visibility and missed Street expectations appear to have 
led to increased investor focus on near-term execution." JX 226 at 5. JPMorgan also advised the 
Committee on whether to approach other suitors pre-signing. JPMorgan noted that an advantage 
would be the "[o]pportunity to create additional competitive tension," but that "[f]inancial buyers 
have similar return hurdles that drive value" and the Committee was therefore "[u]nlikely to see 
any material difference, given comparable LP make-up and return hurdles." Id. at 22. 
On December 6, 2012, the Committee reported to the full Board regarding its progress. 
Mr. Dell made a presentation to the directors in which he expressed his conviction that taking the 
Company private was the best course for the Company and its public shareholders. He set out the 
strategic initiatives he would cause the Company to pursue as a private company, namely, to (i) 
seek to become more competitive in the global PC industry; (ii) hire thousands of sales people, 
particularly in the mid-market segment of the Company's [*26]  enterprise business; (iii) seek to 
compete more effectively in China; (iv) accelerate changes in the Company's business model 
from a configure-to-order model to a build-to-stock model, with more preconfigured product 
offerings; and (v) continue the Company's transformation into a broad IT solutions business. 
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Mr. Dell stated his belief that all of these initiatives would likely be poorly received by the public 
markets because they would dramatically reduce near-term profitability and involve significant 
risk. He expressed the view that the Company could find it difficult to retain its top people in 
such an environment, and that it could also harm the Company's ability to make acquisitions. 
According to Mr. Dell, these initiatives could best be accomplished in an environment without 
quarterly earnings pressure and the risk that shareholder activists might attempt to disrupt the 
Company's plans. Mr. Dell stated that a transaction was in the best interests of the Company's 
shareholders because they would receive a portion of the potential upside from these initiatives 
without bearing the risk. 
JX 231 at 2. 
The Board decided to invite Texas Pacific Group ("TPG") to explore a potential 
transaction. [*27]  Mandl thought TPG might be interested because it had invested in Lenovo 
Group Ltd., an increasingly dominant value-PC producer, and therefore understood the PC 
market. Mandl knew TPG's CEO, so he called him. TPG executed a confidentiality agreement, 
received access to the online data room, and received management presentations. Mr. Dell met 
with TPG's principals at his home. 
On December 23, 2012, TPG informed JPMorgan that it would not submit a bid. TPG reported 
to the Committee that it believed the "cash flows attached to the PC business were simply too 
uncertain, too unpredictable to establish an investment case." Tr. 161 (Mandl). 
 
 
I. The BCG Projections 
On January 2, 2013, BCG provided the Committee with a detailed set of financial forecasts. At a 
meeting on January 15, BCG updated its projections slightly to account for new information 
from the bankers and a new IDC data set. 
BCG's projections included three different cases. The first was the "BCG Base Case," which was 
"more pessimistic than" management's September Case but "in-line with recent analyst reports." 
JX 259 at 13. BCG's other two cases were based on the likelihood of achieving $3.3 billion in 
cost-savings that management [*28]  had identified in connection with a $2 billion cost-savings 
initiative that the Company announced in June 2012. Management had not announced the full 
$3.3 billion to give itself a "cushion." JX 272 at 2. BCG's other two cases assessed the likelihood 
of attaining those savings initiatives, which provided incremental value to the BCG Base Case. 
One assumed that the Company would realize 25% of the savings (the "BCG 25% Case"). The 
other assumed that the Company would realize 75% of savings (the BCG 75% Case). 
BCG believed the BCG 25% Case was attainable and the most reasonable set of projections in 
light of the Company's performance with past cost-saving initiatives. The Committee doubted 
that the Company could achieve the BCG 75% Case, which implied margins in FY 2015 higher 




BCG Base Case 
(in billions) FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 
Revenue $56.85 $56.49 $55.51 
Gross Profit $12.77 $12.89 $12.64 
EBITA $3.85 $3.36 $3.28 
BCG Base Case 
(in billions) FY 2016 FY 2017 
Revenue $55.05 $54.34 
Gross Profit $12.53 $12.30 
EBITA $3.17 $2.98 
BCG 25% Case 
(in billions) FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 
Revenue $56.45 $55.51 $55.05 $54.34 
Gross [*29]  Profit $12.92 $12.78 $12.81 $12.58 
EBITA $3.44 $3.70 $4.01 $3.82 
BCG 75% Case 
(in billions) FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 
Revenue $56.45 $55.51 $55.05 $54.34 
Gross Profit $12.98 $13.06 $13.36 $13.13 
EBITA $3.61 $4.54 $5.69 $5.50 
 
 
J. Evercore Joins The Team. 
On January 7, 2013, Evercore pitched the Committee on serving as a second financial advisor 
who could, if desired, conduct a go-shop. Evercore's materials included a DCF valuation of the 
Company with a range of $14.27 to $18.40 per share. Evercore's LBO analysis supported prices 
of $12.36 to $16.08 assuming sponsor IRR demands of 15% to 25%. 
The Committee retained Evercore the next day. The engagement letter contemplated a $400,000 
monthly retainer and a success fee equal to 0.75% of the incremental value of any superior 
proposal produced during a go-shop, capped at a total of $30 million. 
 
 
K. Silver Lake Increases Its Bid. 
On January 15, 2013, the Committee met to receive updates from management, BCG, JPMorgan, 
and Evercore. Silver Lake had informed the Committee that it would increase its proposal to 
$12.90 per share. In their presentations, JPMorgan and Evercore analyzed the new offer. 
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JPMorgan's analysis showed that Silver Lake's revised offer was towards the [*30]  mid-point or 
upper end of valuation ranges based on trading metrics, trading multiples, market premia, and 
LBO premia. It was within or above the ranges of values generated by a DCF analysis based on 
the market low case and the most conservative BCG case, but below the ranges of values 
generated by a DCF analysis based on the market consensus case, the more optimistic BCG 
projections, and the September Case. Using its LBO model, JPMorgan prepared a chart showing 
what a sponsor could pay depending on its desired level of IRR: 
  Market BCG Base BCG 25% BCG 75% Street September 
  Low Case Case Case Case Consensus Case 
20% 4.5 $11.79 $13.23 $14.52 $17.08 $14.23 $16.81 
year IRR             
25% 4.5 $11.43 $12.67 $13.75 $15.88 $13.50 $15.66 
year IRR             
30% 4.5 $11.14 $12.23 $13.13 $14.92 $12.92 $14.73 
year IRR             
Evercore also prepared an analysis of Silver Lake's proposal. Its valuation conclusions were 
similar to JPMorgan's. Evercore calculated separately that if the Company performed consistent 
with the September Case, then at the price it was offering, Silver Lake would achieve a 5-year 
IRR of 45% and generate a 5.3x multiple on its invested capital, even if Silver Lake exited in 
five years at the same transaction multiple. Mr. Dell would achieve [*31]  a 5-year IRR of 50.1% 
and generate a 6.2x multiple on his invested capital. Evercore calculated that if the Company 
performed in between the BCG 25% Case and BCG 75% Case, then Silver Lake would achieve a 
5-year IRR of 39.8% and generate a 4.5x multiple on its invested capital. Mr. Dell would achieve 
a 5-year IRR of 44.7% and generate a 5.3x multiple on his invested capital. 
Evercore's presentation also addressed the potential for the Committee to generate a higher 
proposal during a go-shop period. Evercore advised that "[s]ince 2005, there have been 137 
transactions with equity values greater than $100 million with go-shop provisions." JX 301 at 26. 
Of those transactions, "only 16 or 12% resulted in a superior offer," and "[t]he superior offers on 
average were 20% greater than the initial bid." Id. Evercore advised the Committee about various 
factors that would affect a go-shop. Id. at 25. 
The Committee discussed recent news leaks about Mr. Dell's exploration of an MBO. In 
response to the leaks, Blackstone Management Partners LLC had reached out to Evercore about 
engaging with the Company. Evercore advised the Committee to wait for the go-shop before 
engaging Blackstone or soliciting additional bids. The [*32]  petitioners observe correctly that 
Evercore would earn a contingency fee only from offers produced during the go-shop period, so 
it had an incentive to prefer that any additional bidder emerge during that phase. 
On January 18, 2013, the full Board met, except for Mr. Dell. During an executive session that 
excluded Mr. Dell and management, the Committee provided an update on its process. Mandl 
informed the Board of the Committee's recommendation "to target a sale price of $13.75 per 
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share, with $13.60 per share as the minimum sale price for agreeing to a deal." JX 315 at 2. The 
other directors endorsed the Committee's recommendation. 
After the meeting, Mandl told Mr. Dell that the Committee would not support a deal below 
$13.75 per share. Durban then called Mandl and offered $13.25 a share. Mandl told him that was 
inadequate. Durban threatened to walk, and Mandl "told him to go ahead." Tr. 169 (Mandl). 
Silver Lake came back at $13.50, but the Committee stood firm. 
At this point, Mr. Dell feared the parties had reached an impasse. To resolve the stalemate, Mr. 
Dell agreed to roll over his shares at a lower valuation than what the public stockholders would 
receive. 
With Mr. Dell's commitment, [*33]  Silver Lake increased the price it would pay for the public 
float. By letter dated February 3, 2013, Silver Lake and Mr. Dell gave the Committee two 
alternatives: (i) an all-cash transaction at $13.60 per share with the Company able to continue 
issuing its regular quarterly dividend until closing, or (ii) an all-cash transaction at $13.75 per 
share with no further dividends. The Committee asked for more, and Silver Lake increased the 
cash component of the first alternative to $13.65 per share. Silver Lake told the Committee that 
this was its best and final offer. 
 
 
L. The Committee And Silver Lake Reach A Deal. 
The Committee met on February 5, 2013, to consider Silver Lake's proposal. Evercore and 
JPMorgan opined that the transaction consideration of $13.65 per share in cash (the "Original 
Merger Consideration") was fair to the unaffiliated stockholders from a financial point of view. 
The bankers' valuation ranges for the Company had not changed materially since their January 
presentations. JPMorgan derived the following valuation indications for Dell: 
• DCF using the September Case: $15.50 to $21.75 per share. 
• DCF using Street consensus case: $11.50 to $16.00 per share. 
• DCF using Street [*34]  low case: $10.63 to $13.87 per share. 
• DCF using the BCG 75% Case: $15.00 to $21.25 per share. 
• DCF using the BCG 25% Case: $12.00 to $16.50 per share. 
• DCF using the BCG Base Case: $10.50 to $14.25 per share. 
• Trading multiples using price/earnings multiples of 5.0x to 10.0x: 
○ using Street consensus: $8.25 to $16.50 per share. 
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○ using BCG Base Case: $7.25 to $14.50 per share. 
○ using BCG 25% Case: $9.00 to $18.00 per share. 
○ using BCG 75% Case: $13.00 to $26.00 per share. 
• 52-week trading range of $8.86 to $18.32 per share. 
JX 331 at 21-22. JPMorgan dropped the discounted equity value approach that it had used in its 
earlier presentations. 
Evercore updated its analysis of the expected return that Silver Lake and Mr. Dell would 
generate based on the Original Merger Consideration: 
    4.5 Year IRR 4.5 Year Multiple on 
        Invested Capital 
    Silver Lake Mr. Dell Silver Lake Mr. Dell 
September Exit at 4.0x 38.1% 43.3% 4.3x 5.1x 
Case Exit at 5.0x 44.6% 50.1% 5.3x 6.2x 
BCG 25% Exit at 4.0x 23.3% 27.9% 2.6x 3.0x 
Case Exit at 5.0x 30.2% 35.1% 3.3x 3.9x 
Street Exit at 4.0x 14.8% 19.2% 1.9x 2.2x 
Median Exit at 5.0x 22.3% 27.0% 2.5x 2.9x 
The Committee recommended that the Board accept Silver Lake's offer, which it did. The 
transaction was documented [*35]  in an agreement and plan of merger dated February 6, 2013 
(together with amendments, the "Merger Agreement") between the Company and three 
counterparties: Denali Holding Inc., Denali Intermediate Inc., and Denali Acquiror Inc., which 
were affiliates of Mr. Dell and Silver Lake (together, the "Buyout Group"). 
Mr. Dell entered into a voting agreement in support of the transaction that required Mr. Dell and 
his affiliates to vote their shares "in the same proportion as the number of [s]hares voted by the 
[u]naffiliated [s]tockholders . . . that are voted in favor of the adoption" of either (i) a superior 
proposal if the Merger Agreement was terminated or (ii) the adoption of the Merger Agreement 
in the event the Board changed its recommendation. JX 355 at 2. Mr. Dell also agreed to roll 
over his shares at $13.36 per share and to invest up to $500 million in additional equity. An 
affiliate of Mr. Dell agreed to invest up to $250 million in additional equity. Post-closing, Mr. 
Dell would own 74.9% of the Company and Silver Lake would own 25.1%. 
The Merger Agreement provided for (i) a forty-five day go-shop period that would expire on 
March 23, 2013, (ii) a one-time match right for the Buyout Group that would apply until 
the [*36]  stockholder vote, and (iii) a $180 million termination fee if the Company agreed to a 
Superior Proposal derived from a bid produced during the go-shop. For non-Superior Proposals 
and bids produced after the go-shop period, the termination fee increased to $450 million. 
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The Merger Agreement defined "Superior Proposal" as 
a bona fide written Acquisition Proposal (with the percentages set forth in clauses (ii) and (iii) of 
the definition of such term changed from 20% to 50% and it being understood that any 
transaction that would constitute an Acquisition Proposal pursuant to clause (ii) or (iii) of the 
definition thereof cannot constitute a Superior Proposal under clause (i) under the definition 
thereof unless it also constitutes a Superior Proposal pursuant to clause (ii) or (iii), as applicable, 
after giving effect to this parenthetical) that the Company Board has determined in its good faith 
judgment . . . is more favorable to the Company's stockholders than the Merger and the other 
transactions contemplated by this Agreement, taking into account all of the terms and conditions 
of such Acquisition Proposal (including the financing, likelihood and timing of consummation 
thereof) . . . [*37]  , provided that notwithstanding the foregoing, an extra-ordinary dividend or 
share repurchase (or any merger or consolidation that is the economic equivalent of an extra-
ordinary dividend or share repurchase) shall not constitute a Superior Proposal unless it 
constitutes a Superior Proposal by virtue of clause (iii) of the definition of Acquisition Proposal 
and the first parenthetical above, and the Person acquiring such shares is not the Company or any 
of its Subsidiaries. 
JX 349 § 5.3(j). The Merger Agreement defined "Acquisition Proposal" as 
any bona fide inquiry, proposal or offer made by any Person for, in a single transaction or a 
series of transactions, (i) a merger, reorganization, share exchange, consolidation, business 
combination, recapitalization, extraordinary dividend or share repurchase, dissolution, 
liquidation or similar transaction involving the Company, (ii) the direct or indirect acquisition by 
any Person or group of twenty percent (20%) or more of the assets of the Company and its 
Subsidiaries, on a consolidated basis or assets of the Company and its Subsidiaries representing 
twenty percent (20%) or more of the consolidated revenues or net income (including, in each 
case, [*38]  securities of the Company's Subsidiaries) or (iii) the direct or indirect acquisition by 
any Person or group of twenty percent (20%) or more of the voting power of the outstanding 
shares of Common Stock, including any tender offer or exchange offer that if consummated 
would result in any Person beneficially owning Shares with twenty percent (20%) or more of the 
voting power of the outstanding shares of Common Stock. 
Id. § 5.3(h). 
 
 
M. The Go-Shop Begins. 
On February 5, 2013, Evercore began the go-shop process. Within ten days, Evercore had 
reached out to sixty parties. Evercore believed that the most promising possibilities were 
Blackstone and Hewlett-Packard Company ("HP"). Blackstone had a sophisticated technology 
group and one of its partners, David Johnson, had recently worked as the Company's head of 
acquisitions. 
HP was the Company's closest competitor and peer. Evercore reached out to HP on the first day 
of the go-shop period, and Evercore met with HP on February 13, 2013. At that meeting, 
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Evercore told HP that a Dell-HP combination could achieve $3-4 billion in annual cost 
synergies. On February 24, HP executed a confidentiality agreement. Evercore believed HP was 
"actively deliberat[ing]" about making [*39]  a run at the Company. JX 395 at 2. In reality, HP 
never accessed the data room and did not submit an indication of interest. 
Evercore insisted that Mr. Dell continue to support the process during the go-shop period. When 
Mr. Dell proposed taking a two-week vacation, Roger Altman of Evercore objected, noting that 
Mr. Dell "wasn't unavailable to Silver Lake at any point during their final 2 pre-offer weeks." JX 
385 at 2. Altman insisted that Mr. Dell "must be available to any other serious party which 
requests it." Id. Mr. Dell complied. 
On March 5, 2013, Carl Icahn and Icahn Enterprises L.P. (together, "Icahn") sent a letter to the 
Board expressing opposition to the Merger and proposing a leveraged recapitalization. The 
Company would borrow funds sufficient to pay a special dividend of $9 to the Company's 
stockholders, and Icahn estimated that the stock would trade at approximately $13.81 per share 
after the transaction, generating aggregate value of $22.81 per share. Evercore representatives 
thought Icahn's "total value—$9 plus $13—seems crazy" because the "stub value [was] too 
high," but otherwise Icahn had "the right idea" and considered his proposal was "smart." JX 390 
at 1. 
Evercore [*40]  had invited Icahn to participate in the go-shop before the March 5 letter. On 
March 10, 2013, Icahn and the Company executed a confidentiality agreement, and Icahn 
accessed the data room the next day. Icahn later had discussions with members of the Company's 
management. 
On March 21, 2013, GE Capital submitted a bid to acquire the Company's financial services unit 
for $3.6 billion in cash. GE Capital said it was happy to have the Committee consider its offer in 
connection with any other bid. 
On March 22, 2013, Icahn submitted a re-structured transaction that offered stockholders a 
choice. They could roll over their shares into a new entity on a one-to-one basis, or they could 
elect to receive $15.00 per share in cash, subject to a cap of $15.6 billion on the total cash 
payments. If the demands for cash payouts exceeded the cap, then stockholders would receive 
their pro rata share. Evercore valued Icahn's proposal at between $13.37 and $14.42 per share. 
Also on March 22, 2013, Blackstone and a consortium of investors proposed a transaction that 
similarly gave stockholders a choice. Under Blackstone's proposal, the Company's existing 
stockholders could elect to receive either a cash payment [*41]  of at least $14.25 per share or a 
package of stock in a new entity valued at $14.25 per share, subject to a cap on the total amount 
of equity that the new entity would issue. Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC provided Blackstone with 
a letter stating it was "highly confident" it could raise the financing for the transaction. JX 422 at 
6. But Blackstone also stated that it was "unwilling to expend additional time and resources" 
pursuing the transaction without "a more level playing field." Id. Blackstone asked the 
Committee to reimburse its out-ofpocket due diligence expenses and said that otherwise it would 




On March 23, 2013, the go-shop period ended. The Committee determined that the Icahn and 
Blackstone offers were, or could reasonably be expected to lead to, Superior Proposals. This 
meant that each qualified as an "Excluded Party," and the Company only would have to pay a 
$180 million termination fee if it entered into a transaction with either of them. 
The Committee considered Blackstone's request for fee reimbursement but did not want to risk 
breaching the Merger Agreement and giving [*42]  the Buyout Group a chance to walk. The 
Committee therefore asked that the Buyout Group consent to the reimbursement. The Buyout 
Group agreed on the condition that Silver Point receive a similar payment. The Committee 
obliged and authorized the Company to reimburse Silver Lake's and Blackstone's actual due 
diligence expenses up to a cap of $25 million each. The Committee did not make a similar offer 
to Icahn. 
On April 2, 2013, Icahn asked for the same type of expense reimbursement. At the time, Icahn 
and the Committee were negotiating over Icahn's request for a waiver of the interested 
stockholder limitations under 8 Del. C. § 203, and the Committee's request in response that Icahn 
agree not to acquire any additional shares. Fearing that Icahn might turn hostile, the Committee 
decided to condition any expense reimbursement on Icahn agreeing to enter into standstill. 
During this period, the Committee and Mr. Dell seemed receptive to an alternative transaction 
involving Blackstone. In an email, Mr. Dell told Blackstone that he felt they were "substantially 
in agreement" on a vision for the Company and that he was "open to considering all 
alternatives." JX 430 at 1. Mr. Dell's outstanding issues were "the [*43]  capital structure" and "a 
proposal on governance." JX 428 at 1. Blackstone also seemed to like Mr. Dell, but Blackstone 
was also prepared to proceed without him. According to a Reuters report, Blackstone began 
vetting alternative CEO candidates. Mr. Dell took offense at the perceived snub and 
communicated his feelings to Blackstone. Blackstone's CEO did not respond to Mr. Dell's calls. 
Blackstone made a significant commitment to due diligence. Over 460 individuals associated 
with Blackstone accessed the virtual data room. Approximately forty Blackstone and twenty 
Company employees assembled in a ballroom in Texas to conduct additional diligence. The 
room was so large that directions had to be given over a microphone. Mr. Dell noted that he 
"spent more time with Blackstone than any of the other participants." JX 461 at 1. The 
Company's management team as a whole spent more time with Blackstone than Silver Lake. 
 
 
N. The Company Suffers Further Market Setbacks. 
On April 10, 2013, IDC published a report stating that worldwide PC shipments had declined 
13.9% year over year and 13.2% quarter over quarter. Those numbers "stunned" the Committee. 
Tr. 182 (Mandl). Conigliaro asked BCG to re-evaluate [*44]  its previously expressed view that 
market trends in the PC business were having only a "relatively modest impact on the Dell 
earnings power"; Conigliaro believed that IDC's numbers reflected a "changing ecosystem." JX 
497 at 1. 
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Mr. Dell had a different reaction. Although the Company's sales of PCs had declined by 10.9% 
year over year and 4.9% quarter over quarter, the Company had increased its market share by 
0.4% and 1% respectively during the same periods. Mr. Dell viewed market share as more 
important, and he reacted to the report by explaining, "This is what we love to see!! Let's keep it 
going!!" JX 458 at 1. Mr. Dell's comment confirms that he was focused on a long-term strategy 
of stabilizing revenues and capturing market share at the expense of short-term margins, just as 
he repeatedly had told the Board, the Committee, and stock market analysts. 
On April 18, 2013, Blackstone dropped out of the sale process. Its letter to the Committee stated 
that 
a number of significant adverse issues have surfaced since we submitted our letter proposal to 
[the Committee] on March 22nd, including: (1) an unprecedented 14 percent market decline in 
PC volume in the first quarter of 2013, its steepest [*45]  drop in history, and inconsistent with 
Management's projections for modest industry growth; and (2) the rapidly eroding financial 
profile of Dell. Since our bid submission, we learned that the company revised its operating 
income projections for the current year to $3.0 billion from $3.7 billion. 
JX 476 at 2. Notably, Blackstone had not been given the internal forecasts for the Company that 
BCG had prepared, so it did not have access to that alternative view of the Company's projected 
cash flows. Blackstone first learned of the projections when they were included in the Company's 
preliminary proxy statement. 
On May 9, 2013, Icahn and Southeastern joined together to propose a modified recapitalization 
in which stockholders would retain their current holdings and could elect to receive either (i) a 
distribution of $12.00 per share in cash or (ii) $12.00 worth of additional shares of stock, with 
the new equity issued at a value of $1.65 per share. Icahn and Southeastern proposed replacing 
the Board with a slate of new directors who they believed would approve their transaction. 
Because it was strictly a leveraged recapitalization, Evercore thought it was unlikely that Icahn's 
new proposal [*46]  could qualify as a Superior Proposal under the Merger Agreement. Tr. 382-
83 (Hiltz). 
On May 16, 2013, the Company released its results for the first quarter of FY 2014. Revenue 
declined just 2% from the previous year, but net income declined by 79%. GAAP earnings per 
share fell 81% year over year, and non-GAAP earnings fell 51%. According to an analyst from 
Bernstein Research, the margins for the enterprise solutions and services segment were "woeful, 
and well below industry peers." JX 515 at 3. Even Gladden expressed doubts, commenting on 
the Bernstein report that "[i]t's not apparent that the shift to growth will bring profit and cash in 
the short or long term." Id. at 1. 
"Most [analysts] were shocked at the profitability results." Id. at 1. Revenues beat Street 
estimates by about 4%, but earnings per share came in approximately 29% below the consensus. 
According to BCG, the quarter "miss [was] HUGE." JX 513 at 1. Analysts disagreed about the 
long-term implications for the Company. The Bernstein analyst focused on the enterprise 
solutions and services division, noting that it generated "essentially no profits," which was "a 
sober finding, given the company's strategic intent is to migrate the company [*47]  to enterprise 
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offerings." JX 515 at 3. The analyst attributed the division's poor performance to "myriad factors 
— none of which have easy fixes." Id. 
After the Company's poor quarter, the market consensus for FY 2014 operating income dropped 
by 24% from $3.3 billion to $2.5 billion. By contrast, analysts increased their expectations for 
HP by 3% during the same period, suggesting that they had particular concerns about the 
Company. The market consensus forecast for operating income during FY 2014 fell short of the 
BCG Base Case by approximately $800 million. The Company's earnings release indicated 
annualized EBITA for FY 2014 was trending to $2.54 billion, also about $800 million below the 
BCG Base Case. 
Despite the Company's poor quarterly performance, BCG continued to believe that the 
Company's long-term earnings power would not be adversely affected by the market trends. 
BCG believed that the market had not deteriorated more than that projected in the BCG Base 
Case and attributed the Company's poor results to management's decision to sacrifice margins to 
maintain market share. 
By contrast, on the cost-savings initiatives, BCG concluded that the "[p]roductivity cost take 
out" was "not on track [*48]  and will not deliver bottom line benefits in FY14." JX 536 at 19. 
Although the costs savings underlying the BCG 25% Case remained "achievable," they were 
"unlikely to be realized in [this] year under current strategy." Id. at 23. This made the BCG 75% 
Case even less likely. 
 
 
O. Stockholder Opposition Leads To A Price Bump. 
The Board scheduled a special meeting of stockholders to vote on the Merger for July 18, 2013. 
The Board set a record date for the meeting of June 3. Icahn opposed the Merger. Many value-
based investors, including T. Rowe Price, also opposed the Merger. They had bought stock 
believing that the market was under-valuing the non-PC-related businesses. These stockholders 
had the same investment thesis as Mr. Dell. 
On May 31, 2013, the Company filed its definitive proxy statement. In the proxy statement, the 
directors disclosed that the "Committee did not seek to determine a pre-merger going concern 
value for the Common Stock to determine the fairness of the merger consideration to the 
Company's unaffiliated stockholders." JX 532 at 71. The Committee instead cited other reasons 
for recommending the transaction, such as the (i) the certainty of cash consideration, (ii) the 
approximately [*49]  37% premium over the ninety-day-average unaffected trading price of 
$9.97, and (iii) the approximately 25% premium over the one-day unaffected trading price of 
$10.88. The Committee also cited the declining Street consensus for the Company's earnings per 
share, which had been $2.02 in August 2012 and had fallen to $1.66 by February 2013, when the 
Merger was announced. In June 2013, after the proxy statement was issued, the Street consensus 
fell to $1.00. 
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On June 6, 2013, Icahn filed his preliminary proxy statement. On June 18, Icahn disclosed that 
his affiliates had purchased approximately 72 million shares of common stock from Southeastern 
at $13.52 per share. 
On June 19, 2013, Icahn wrote to the Company's stockholders to say he would run an alternate 
slate of directors at the annual meeting. Once his slate won, the new directors would jettison the 
Merger and implement a self-tender at $14 per share for approximately 1.1 billion shares. Icahn 
represented that he would not tender. On July 1, he announced lender commitments for $5.2 
billion in debt financing for the tender offer. 
Supporters of the Merger received a boost on July 8, 2013, when Institutional Shareholder 
Services, Glass Lewis [*50]  & Co. and Egan-Jones Rating Company recommended that 
stockholders vote in favor of the Merger. 
On July 12, 2013, Icahn revised his self-tender proposal to add one warrant for every four shares 
tendered. Each warrant would entitle the holder for a period of seven years to purchase one share 
of Company common stock for $20. 
On July 17, 2013, the Committee learned from its proxy solicitor that stockholders were not 
likely to approve the Merger at the special meeting on the next day. Rather than holding the vote, 
the Committee convened the meeting and adjourned it until July 24. 
Seeking to avoid defeat at the polls, the Buyout Group delivered a revised proposal to the 
Committee on July 23, 2013. The original Merger Agreement required that a majority of all 
unaffiliated stockholders approve the Merger. The revised proposal called for reducing the 
requirement to a majority of the unaffiliated stockholders present at the meeting or voting by 
proxy. In exchange, the Buyout Group proposed to increase the merger consideration by $0.10 
per share. 
On July 24, 2013, the Committee convened the meeting and adjourned it until August 2. On July 
30, the Committee rejected the revised proposal as inadequate. [*51]  The market price of the 
Company's common stock fell 2.55% on the news. Some observers thought the Merger was 
dead. 
On July 31, 2013, the Buyout Group offered a package of additional consideration in return for 
the lowered voting condition. The package contemplated 
• an additional $0.10 per share in merger consideration, increasing the total merger consideration 
to $13.75, 
• a special cash dividend of $0.08 per share, 
• a commitment that the Company would pay its third quarter dividend of $0.08 per share, 
regardless of the closing date, and 
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• a reduction in the termination fee from $450 million to $180 million if a leveraged 
recapitalization or similar transaction occurred within twelve months after stockholders voted 
down the Merger. 
The Committee countered, saying it would accept the revised offer if the special cash dividend 
was raised to $0.13. The Buyout Group agreed. Taking into account the dividends, the total value 
of the package was $13.96 per share. Mr. Dell financed the change by agreeing to reduce the 
value attributed to his rollover shares from $13.36 to $12.51. 
On August 2, 2013, the Committee met. JPMorgan and Evercore opined that the increased 
merger consideration of $13.75 [*52]  per share (the "Final Merger Consideration") was fair 
from a financial point of view to the unaffiliated holders of the Company's common stock. 
JPMorgan relied on the same projections it used in February when opining that the Original 
Merger Consideration was fair. JPMorgan observed that since then, the PC industry had shown 
"continued softness and deterioration," making the increased offer superior compared to its 
earlier opinion. Tr. 742 (Rajkovic). 
Evercore's analysis changed. When Evercore valued the Company in February, it relied on a 
forecast projecting annual operating income for FY 2014 of $3.7 billion. The first quarter of FY 
2014 resulted in annualized (non-GAAP) operating income of $2.4 billion. The first six months 
of FY 2014 resulted in annualized operating income of $2.2 billion. As a result, Evercore "had 
no confidence in" the projections, so it used primarily market-based metrics to opine that the 
Final Merger Consideration was fair. Tr. 408 (Hiltz). 
The Committee recommended that the Board approve the revised transaction, which it did. By 
agreement dated August 2, 2013, the Buyout Group and the Company amended the Merger 
Agreement to account for the changed voting condition [*53]  and the additional consideration. 




P. More Results And Forecasts 
On August 15, 2013, the Company reported its financial results for the second quarter of FY 
2014. Revenue increased but margins suffered. For a second consecutive quarter, net income 
declined, this time by more than 70% year over year. 
The next day, IDC issued a public report in which it lowered its five-year forecast for PC 
shipments to negative 8%. This was 62 basis points lower than its August 2011 forecast and 41 
basis points lower than its August 2012 forecast. IDC opined that the Company's enterprise 
solutions and services division would face "intense competition." JX 660 at 2-3. 
Mr. Dell took an optimistic view of the IDC report. In an email to Silver Lake, he expressed 
pride that IDC continued to identify the Company as the largest and most profitable supplier of 
computers to end users. Although Lenovo and HP sold more units, the Company continued to 
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dominate in premium products. Mr. Dell compared the Company to Mercedes and Lenovo to 
Hyundai. 
Around this time, the Company's management and the Buyout Group made a 
presentation [*54]  to the rating agencies on the Company's post-acquisition debt. They used a 
set of projections that were more optimistic than analyst forecasts or the IDC report and 
contemplated 2-3% growth over the long term. Management told the rating agencies that the 
Company was "well on [its] way" to achieving $1.3 billion out of a targeted $3.5 billion in cost-
savings, and they were "very confident" that the Company would deliver the remaining savings. 
JX 669 at 27. Management recognized that "[f]inancial performance has been mixed over the 
past 5 years" and explained that it was the result of "conscious trade-offs to reposition and 
transform the company." Id. at 32. 
In September 2013, Silver Lake and Mr. Dell made a presentation to the banks that would 
finance the Merger. The materials included a revised set of projections that contemplated lower 
gross profit and EBITA relative to an earlier set of projections it submitted to banks, but 
increased revenues (the "Bank Case"). The Bank Case also projected that the Company's margins 
would increase over of next five years. The Bank Case modeled $3.6 billion in cost savings, with 
$2.6 billion appearing in the forecasts and another $1 billion as a separate line item. 
The [*55]  "cumulative realized incremental cost savings" identified $500 million in savings in 
FY 2015, and $1 billion in each the following three years. JX 678 at 13. The Bank Case included 
the following key metrics. 
Bank Case 
(in billions) FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 
Revenue $57.20 $58.71 $60.24 $62.03 $63.15 
Gross Profit $11.64 $12.42 $12.98 $13.56 $13.93 
EBITA $2.76 $3.15 $3.53 $3.90 $4.14 
While presenting the Bank Case, Silver Lake produced a chart that modeled its expected IRRs 
depending on the degree to which the Company achieved its cost-savings goals and the EBITDA 
multiple for an anticipated exit. The chart emphasized an exit multiple of 4.5x and asked the 
banks to treat that outcome as the model case: 
Annual Cost FY2018E Trailing EBITDA Exit Multiple 
Savings 3.0x 4.0x 4.5x 5.0x 6.0x 
$0 15.6% 25.1% 29.2% 32.7% 38.8% 
$500 21.5% 30.5% 34.2% 37.8% 43.6% 
$1000 26.6% 35.1% 38.7% 42.2% 47.9% 
With zero incremental cost savings, Silver Lake anticipated achieving an IRR of 29.2%, 
indicating that even for purposes of the LBO pricing model, the Final Merger Consideration was 





Q. Stockholders Approve The Deal. 
The special meeting took place on September 12, 2013. Under Delaware law, a [*56]  merger 
requires the approval of holders of a majority of the outstanding shares, making that the 
appropriate denominator for consideration. In the Company's case, holders of 57% of the 
Company's shares voted in favor of the Merger. Because not all stockholders vote, and because a 
non-vote counts the same as a "no" vote, the percentage always will be higher for the shares that 
actually voted. In the Company's case, holders of approximately 70% of the shares present at the 
meeting voted in favor. Both are relatively low margins. 
Icahn and Southeastern indicated originally that they would seek appraisal if the Merger was 
approved, and they encouraged other stockholders to do so. Instead, Icahn and Southeastern 
withdrew their appraisal demands. Icahn withdrew his competing director nominations. 
On October 21, 2013, BCG wrapped up its engagement by providing the Committee with a final 
report on the Company. Because the Committee did not ask, BCG did not update its forecasts. 
But BCG noted that it expected that end-user computing, which accounted for two-thirds of the 
Company's operating income, to decline between 8% and 15% per year. BCG also noted that the 
"PC market has been unusually turbulent" [*57]  and its "modeling indicates there is a potential 
for rapid ~$1.5B decline in" the end-user computing division's operating income by FY 2017. JX 
721 at 4. BCG expected that enterprise solutions and services, which accounted for the other 
third of the Company's operating income, would grow between 5 and 8% per year, but BCG did 
not think the growth would "close [the] gap" in operating income caused by the weakening end-
user computing division. JX 721 at 4. To "close the gap," the Company would have to rely on 
cost-savings initiatives. BCG repeated its assessment from May that the BCG 25% Case 
remained achievable, but given management execution, the Company was not likely to realize 
the necessary savings to support the projections until the end of the fiscal year. 
On October 28, 2013, the Company issued a $0.13 special dividend to all stockholders. The 
Merger closed the next day. By operation of law, any shares of common stock held by public 
stockholders who did not seek appraisal and perfect their appraisal rights properly were 
converted into the right to receive the Merger Consideration, without interest. 
 
 
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
HN1  "An appraisal proceeding is a limited legislative remedy intended [*58]  to provide 
shareholders dissenting from a merger on grounds of inadequacy of the offering price with a 
judicial determination of the intrinsic worth (fair value) of their shareholdings." Cede & Co. v. 
Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor I), 542 A.2d 1182, 1186 (Del. 1988). Section 262(h) of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law (the "DGCL") states that 
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the Court shall determine the fair value of the shares exclusive of any element of value arising 
from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation, together with interest, if 
any, to be paid upon the amount determined to be the fair value. In determining such fair value, 
the Court shall take into account all relevant factors. 
8 Del. C. § 262(h). The statute thus places the obligation to determine the fair value of the shares 
squarely on the court. Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publ'rs, Inc., 701 A.2d 357, 361-62 (Del. 
1997). 
HN2  Because of the statutory mandate, the allocation of the burden of proof in an appraisal 
proceeding differs from a liability proceeding. "In a statutory appraisal proceeding, both sides 
have the burden of proving their respective valuation positions by a preponderance of evidence." 
M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 520 (Del. 1999). "No presumption, 
favorable or unfavorable, attaches to either side's valuation." Pinson v. Campbell—Taggart, Inc., 
1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 50, 1989 WL 17438, at *6 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 1989). 
Each party also bears the burden of proving the constituent elements of its valuation position by 
a preponderance [*59]  of the evidence, including the propriety of a particular method, 
modification, discount, or premium. If both parties fail to meet the preponderance standard on 
the ultimate question of fair value, the Court is required under the statute to make its own 
determination. 
In re Appraisal of Dole Food Co., Inc., 114 A.3d 541, 550 (Del. Ch. 2014) (quoting Jesse A. 
Finkelstein & John D. Hendershot, Appraisal Rights in Mergers & Consolidations, 38-5th C.P.S. 
§§ IV(H)(3), at A-89 to A-90 (BNA) (collecting cases) [hereinafter Appraisal Rights]). 
HN3  "In discharging its statutory mandate, the Court of Chancery has discretion to select one 
of the parties' valuation models as its general framework or to fashion its own." M.G. 
Bancorporation, 737 A.2d at 525-26. "The Court may evaluate the valuation opinions submitted 
by the parties, select the most representative analysis, and then make appropriate adjustments to 
the resulting valuation."3  The court also may "make its own independent valuation calculation 
by . . . adapting or blending the factual assumptions of the parties' experts." M.G. 
Bancorporation, 737 A.2d at 524. It is also "entirely proper for the Court of Chancery to adopt 
any one expert's model, methodology, and mathematical calculations, in toto, if that valuation is 
supported by credible evidence and withstands a critical judicial analysis [*60]  on the record." 
Id. at 526. "When . . . none of the parties establishes a valuation that is persuasive, the Court 
must make a determination based on its own analysis."4  
The standard of "fair value" is "a jurisprudential concept that draws more from judicial writings 
than from the appraisal statue itself." Del. Open MRI, 898 A.2d at 310. HN4  "The concept of 
fair value under Delaware law is not equivalent to the economic concept of fair market value. 
Rather, [*61]  the concept of fair value for purposes of Delaware's appraisal statute is a largely 
judge-made creation, freighted with policy considerations." Finkelstein v. Liberty Digital, Inc., 
2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 53, 2005 WL 1074364, at *12 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2005) (Strine, V.C.). In 
Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523, 74 A.2d 71 (Del. 1950), the Delaware Supreme 
Court explained in detail the concept of value that the appraisal statute employs: 
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The basic concept of value under the appraisal statute is that the stockholder is entitled to be paid 
for that which has been taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest in a going concern. By 
value of the stockholder's proportionate interest in the corporate enterprise is meant the true or 
intrinsic value of his stock which has been taken by the merger. In determining what figure 
represents the true or intrinsic value, . . . the courts must take into consideration all factors and 
elements which reasonably might enter into the fixing of value. Thus, market value, asset value, 
dividends, earning prospects, the nature of the enterprise and any other facts which were known 
or which could be ascertained as of the date of the merger and which throw any light on future 
prospects of the merged corporation are not only pertinent to an inquiry as to the value of the 
dissenting stockholder's interest, but must be considered [*62]  . . . .5  
Subsequent Delaware Supreme Court decisions have adhered consistently to this definition of 
value.6  
HN5  "The time for determining the value of a dissenter's shares is the point just before the 
merger transaction 'on the date of the merger.'" Appraisal Rights, supra, at A-33 (quoting 
Technicolor I, 542 A.2d at 1187). Put differently, the valuation date is the date on which the 
merger closes.7  Consequently, if the value of the corporation changes between the signing of 
the merger and the closing, the fair value determination must be measured by the "operative 
reality" of the corporation at the effective time of the merger.8  
HN6  The statutory obligation to make a single determination of a corporation's value 
introduces an impression of false precision into appraisal jurisprudence. "The value of a 
corporation is not a point on a line, but a range of reasonable values, and the judge's task is to 
assign one particular value within this range as the most reasonable value in light of all the 
relevant evidence and based on considerations of fairness." Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 
2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 146, 2003 WL 23700218, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 9, 2004), aff'd in part, rev'd 
on other grounds, 884 A.2d 26 (Del. 2005). 
 
 
A. The Final Merger Consideration As The Best Evidence Of Fair Value 
The Company contends that the Final Merger Consideration is the best evidence of the 
Company's fair value on the closing date. As the proponent of this valuation [*64]  methodology, 
the Company bears the burden of establishing its reliability and persuasiveness. In this case, the 
Final Merger Consideration is certainly a relevant factor, but it is not the best evidence of the 
Company's fair value. 
 
 
1. Deal Price As A Subset Of Market Value 
The consideration that the buyer agrees to provide in the deal and that the seller agrees to accept 
is one form of market price data, which Delaware courts have long considered in appraisal 
proceedings. See generally Appraisal Rights, supra, at A-57 to A-59. Traditionally, Delaware 
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decisions focused on stock market prices, rather than the deal price. "[T]here is extensive case 
law on [the use of stock] market value because of its role as one of the three elements of the 
Delaware Block Method." Id. at A-57. Chancellor Allen summarized the law as follows: 
It is, of course, axiomatic that HN7  if there is an established market for shares of a corporation 
the market value of such shares must be taken into consideration in an appraisal of their intrinsic 
value. . . . It is, of course, equally axiomatic that market value, either actual or constructed, is not 
the sole element to be taken into consideration in the appraisal of stock. 
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259, 1990 WL 161084, at *31 (Del. Ch. 
Oct. 19, 1990) (quoting In re Del. Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 213 A.2d 203, 211 (Del. 1965) 
(citing Tri-Cont'l [*65]  and Munds)), rev'd on other grounds, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994). 
Numerous cases support Chancellor Allen's observations that (i) pricing data from a thick and 
efficient market should be considered9  and (ii) market price alone is not dispositive.10  
Recent jurisprudence has emphasized Delaware courts' willingness to consider market price data 
generated not only by the market for individual shares but also by the market for the company as 
a whole. HN8  If the merger giving rise to appraisal rights "resulted from an arm's-length 
process between two independent parties, and if no structural impediments existed that might 
materially distort the 'crucible of objective market reality,'" then "a reviewing court should give 
substantial evidentiary weight to the merger price as an indicator of fair value."11  
Here too, however, HN9  the Delaware Supreme Court has eschewed market fundamentalism 
by making clear that market price data is neither conclusively determinative of nor 
presumptively equivalent to fair value: 
HN10  Section 262(h) neither dictates nor even contemplates that the Court of Chancery should 
consider the transactional market price of the underlying company. Rather, in determining "fair 
value," the statute instructs that the court "shall take into account all relevant factors." 
Importantly, this Court has defined "fair value" as the value to a stockholder of the firm as a 
going concern, as opposed to the firm's value in the context of an acquisition or other transaction. 
Determining "fair value" through "all relevant factors" may be an imperfect process, but the 
General Assembly has determined it to be an appropriately fair process. . . . 
HN11  Section 262(h) unambiguously calls upon the Court of Chancery to perform an 
independent evaluation of "fair value" at the time of a transaction. It vests the Chancellor and 
Vice [*68]  Chancellors with significant discretion to consider "all relevant favors" and 
determine the going concern value of the underlying company. Requiring the Court of Chancery 
to defer—conclusively or presumptively—to the merger price, even in the face of a pristine, 
unchallenged transactional process, would contravene the unambiguous language of the statute 
and the reasoned holdings of our precedent. It would inappropriately shift the responsibility to 
determine "fair value" from the court to the private parties. Also, while it is difficult for the 
Chancellor and Vice Chancellors to assess wildly divergent expert opinions regarding value, 
inflexible rules governing appraisal provide little additional benefit in determining "fair value" 
because of the already high costs of appraisal actions. . . . Therefore, we reject . . . [the] call to 
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establish a rule requiring the Court of Chancery to defer to the merger price in any appraisal 
proceeding. 
Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Glob. GT LP (Golden Telecom II), 11 A.3d 214, 217-18 (Del. 2010) 
(footnotes omitted). 
Since Golden Telecom II, and consistent with the Delaware Supreme Court's teaching in that 
decision, HN12  the Court of Chancery has considered the deal price as one of the "relevant 
factors" when determining fair value.12  In at least five [*69]  decisions, the Court of Chancery 
has found the deal price to be the most reliable indicator of the company's fair value, particularly 
when other evidence of fair value was weak.13  
Depending on the facts of the case, a variety of factors may undermine the potential 
persuasiveness of the deal price as evidence of fair value. For one, in a public company merger, 
the need for a stockholder vote, regulatory approvals, and other time-intensive steps may 
generate a substantial delay between the signing date and the closing date. The deal price 
provides a data point for the market price of the company as of the date of signing, but as 
discussed above, the valuation date for an appraisal is the date of closing. See Part II, supra. 
Market pricing indications can change rapidly, whether in the stock market or the deal market.14
 
Another issue is the reality that the M&A market for an entire company has different and less 
confidence-promoting attributes than the public trading markets: 
Among the other requirements for market efficiency are liquidity and fungibility. Public stock 
market prices are generally efficient because large numbers of identical shares of stock in a given 
company trade on a highly liquid market with millions of participants. The deal market, 
however—dealing as it does with entire companies, rather than individual shares—often lacks 
both qualities. No two companies are exactly alike, and the market for whole companies is 
unavoidably chunky, rather than liquid. As such, the deal market is unavoidably less efficient at 
valuing entire companies (including the value of control) than the stock market is at valuing 
minority shares.15  
The limitations on efficient pricing in the market [*73]  for corporate control "are especially 
pronounced in the context of MBOs." Iman Anabtawi, Predatory Management Buyouts, 49 U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 1285, 1320 (2016). 
Writing as a Vice Chancellor, Chief Justice Strine observed that even for purposes of 
determining the value of individual shares, where the stock market is typically thick and liquid, 
the proponents of the efficient capital markets hypothesis no longer make the strong-form claim 
that the market price actually determines fundamental value; at most they make the semi-strong 
claim that market prices reflect all available information [*74]  and are efficient at incorporating 
new information.16  The M&A market has fewer buyers and one seller, and the dissemination 
of critical, non-public due diligence information is limited to participants who sign 
confidentiality agreements. It is therefore erroneous to "conflate the stock market (which is 
generally highly efficient) with the deal market (which often is not)." Modern Appraisal 
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Litigation, supra, at 50. It is perhaps more erroneous to claim that the thinner M&A market 
generates a price consistent with fundamental efficiency, when the same claim is no longer made 
for the thicker markets in individual shares. 
There is also the recognized problem that an arms' length deal price often includes synergies. 
This can be true even for a financial buyer, because [*77]  "the aggregation of shares, which 
eliminates agency costs in the process, is a value-creating transaction." Lawrence A. Hamermesh 
& Michael L. Wachter, Rationalizing Appraisal Standards in Compulsory Buyouts, 50 B.C. L. 
Rev. 1021, 1050 (2009). The value of synergies "would not otherwise exist in the enterprise 
itself" and therefore represent an "'element of value arising from the accomplishment or 
expectation of the merger or consolidation' that must be excluded" Id. at 1029 (quoting 8 Del. C. 
§ 262). Consequently, "the appraisal statute requires that the Court exclude any synergies present 
in the deal price—that is, value arising solely from the deal." BMC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 268, 
2015 WL 6164771, at *14. 
These three factors suggest that even with a public company target, deal price will not inevitably 
equate to fair value. It could be higher or lower. Doubtless other factors, some of which favor the 
deal price and others which cut against it, will emerge from academic research and through case-
by-case development. The respondent corporation still may be able to establish that the merger 
price is the best evidence of fair value—and it often will be—but the corporation must carry its 
burden on that point. See Golden Telecom II, 11 A.3d at 217-18. 
 
 
2. The Appraisal Inquiry Contrasted With The Breach Of Fiduciary Duty Inquiry 
HN13  An equally [*78]  important consideration when evaluating the persuasiveness of the 
deal price for establishing fair value is the nature of the court's review of the process that led to 
the transaction. Here, the distinction between a breach of fiduciary duty case and an appraisal 
proceeding looms large: 
HN14  [W]hile the transaction particulars undergirding appraisal are related to and can 
sometimes overlap with those relevant to the fiduciary duty class action, the emphasis is 
crucially different. In a fiduciary duty class action, the court is faced with the question of holding 
individual directors personally liable for having breached their duties to the stockholders. Courts 
are naturally and properly hesitant to take such a drastic step lest directors become risk-averse, 
making decisions with an eye toward minimizing the risk of personal liability rather than seeking 
to maximize expected value for stockholders. An appraisal action asks a substantially more 
modest question: did the stockholders get fair value for their shares in the merger? If not, the 
acquirer must make up the difference, but no one is held personally liable. 
Modern Appraisal Litigation, supra, at 48 (footnote omitted). The two inquiries are different, so a 
sale process might pass muster [*79]  for purposes of a breach of fiduciary claim and yet still 
generate a sub-optimal process for purposes of an appraisal. 
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HN15  The central question in a breach of fiduciary duty case is whether the defendant 
fiduciaries acted in a manner that should subject them personally to a damages award. To 
determine whether a breach of duty occurred, a court applying Delaware law evaluates the 
directors' conduct through the lens of a standard of review. "Delaware has three tiers of review 
for evaluating director decision-making: the business judgment rule, enhanced scrutiny, and 
entire fairness." Reis v. Hazelett Strip—Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 457 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
"Enhanced scrutiny is Delaware's intermediate standard of review." In re Trados Inc. S'holder 
Litig. (Trados II), 73 A.3d 17, 43 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
Framed for purposes of an M&A transaction, enhanced scrutiny places the burden on the 
defendant directors to show that they sought "to secure the transaction offering the best value 
reasonably available for the stockholders." Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 
A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1994). In this formulation, "[t]he key verb is 'sought.' Time-bound mortals 
cannot foresee the future. The test therefore cannot be whether, with hindsight, the directors 
actually achieved the best price." In re Del Monte Foods Co. S'holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 830 
(Del. Ch. 2011). "Rather, the duty can only be to try in good faith, in such a setting, to get the 
best available transaction [*80]  for the shareholders. Directors are not insurers."17  
HN16  To determine whether directors have satisfied their fiduciary duties in an M&A setting, 
the enhanced scrutiny standard of review examines (i) the reasonableness of "the decisionmaking 
process employed by the directors, including the information on which the directors based their 
decision," and (ii) "the reasonableness of the directors' action in light of the circumstances then 
existing." QVC, 637 A.2d at 44. "Through this examination, the court seeks to assure itself that 
the board acted reasonably, in the sense of taking a logical and reasoned approach for the 
purpose of advancing a proper objective, and to thereby smoke out mere pretextual 
justifications [*81]  for improperly motivated decisions." Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 598. The 
reasonableness standard enables a reviewing court "to address inequitable action even when 
directors may have subjectively believed that they were acting properly." Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 
830-31. The objective standard does not permit a reviewing court to freely substitute its own 
judgment for the directors': 
HN17  There are many business and financial considerations implicated in investigating and 
selecting the best value reasonably available. The board of directors is the corporate 
decisionmaking body best equipped to make these judgments. Accordingly, a court applying 
enhanced judicial scrutiny should be deciding whether the directors made a reasonable decision, 
not a perfect decision. If a board selected one of several reasonable alternatives, a court should 
not second-guess that choice even though it might have decided otherwise or subsequent events 
may have cast doubt on the board's determination. Thus, courts will not substitute their business 
judgment for that of the directors, but will determine if the directors' decision was, on balance, 
within a range of reasonableness. 
QVC, 637 A.2d at 45 (emphasis removed). Enhanced scrutiny "is not a license for law-trained 
courts to second-guess [*82]  reasonable, but debatable, tactical choices that directors have made 
in good faith." In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1000 (Del. Ch. 2005); 
accord Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 595-96 ("[A]t bottom Revlon is a test of reasonableness; 
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directors are generally free to select the path to value maximization, so long as they choose a 
reasonable route to get there."). 
As these passages show, HN18  enhanced scrutiny requires an inquiry into the ends the 
directors pursued and the means they chose to achieve them. "[T]he reasonableness standard 
requires the court to consider for itself whether the board is truly well motivated (i.e. is it acting 
for the proper ends?) before ultimately determining whether its means were themselves a 
reasonable way of advancing those ends." Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 599. Enhanced scrutiny 
"mandates that the court look closely at the motivations of the board." Id. at 598. What typically 
generates a finding of breach "is evidence of self-interest, undue favoritism or disdain towards a 
particular bidder, or a similar non-stockholder-motivated influence that calls into question the 
integrity of the process." Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 831. The test is not whether the outcome was in 
fact the best transaction reasonably available, and the failure to achieve what actually would 
have been the best transactional outcome, standing [*83]  alone, is not a basis for liability. The 
outcome that the directors achieved will figure into the damages calculation, but only if the 
matter reaches that phase. The outcome is not part of the liability case. 
In an appraisal proceeding, by contrast, the opposite is true. HN19  The court does not judge the 
directors' motives or the reasonableness of their actions, but rather the outcome they achieved. 
The price is all that matters because the court's inquiry focuses exclusively on the value of the 
company. How and why the directors achieved fair value or fell short is not part of the case. The 
sale process is useful to the extent—and only to the extent—that it provides evidence of the 
company's value on the date the merger closed. 
HN20  Because the standards differ, it is entirely possible that the decisions made during a sale 
process could fall within Revlon's range of reasonableness, and yet the process still could 
generate a price that was not persuasive evidence of fair value in an appraisal.18  Put differently, 
even if a transaction passes fiduciary muster, an appraisal proceeding could result in a higher fair 
value award.19  
To be sure, the questions in the two kinds of actions are frequently related. [*84]  Often, when 
stockholders do not get fair value for their shares, it will be because the board has breached its 
fiduciary duties. . . . [T]he strongest appraisal claims [should] also present strong fiduciary duty 
claims, and vice versa. But forcing both types of claims into the same analytical box is a self-
evident mistake. Many types of managerial sloth, incompetence, pressure, or collusion that 
courts have been understandably hesitant to characterize as breaches of fiduciary duty can 
nonetheless lead to . . . stockholders receiving well below fair value for their shares. In such 
situations, appraisal constitutes a useful middle course between holding directors personally 
liable (and potentially granting injunctions) and allowing unfair transactions to escape 
meaningful scrutiny. 
Modern Appraisal Litigation, supra, at 48. HN21  "Satisfying one of the various Revlon-type 
tests . . . is not necessarily a market test" sufficient to establish fair value for purposes of 
appraisal. Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public 





3. MBO Status As An Additional Factor 
A third factor when considering the persuasiveness of the deal price is the fact that the Merger 
was an MBO. Because of management's additional and conflicting role as buyer, MBOs present 
different concerns than true arms' length transactions. A vast amount of case law20  and 
scholarship (both legal21  and empirical22 ) has addressed MBOs. Although the literature is far 
from unanimous in its analysis and policy recommendations,23  the weight of authority suggests 
that a claim that the bargained-for price in an MBO represents fair value should be evaluated 
with greater thoroughness and care than, at the other end of the spectrum, a transaction with a 
strategic buyer in which management will not be retained. 
 
 
4. The Sale Process In This Case 
In this case, the Company's process easily would sail through if reviewed under enhanced 
scrutiny. The Committee and its advisors did many praiseworthy things, and it would burden an 
already long opinion to catalog [*89]  them. In a liability proceeding, this court could not hold 
that the directors breached their fiduciary duties or that there could be any basis for liability. But 
that is not the same as proving that the deal price provides the best evidence of the Company's 
fair value. In this case, a combination of factors undercut the relationship between the Final 
Merger Consideration and fair value, undermining the persuasiveness of the former as evidence 
of the latter. 
 
 
a. The Pre-Signing Phase 
The sale process in this case had two phases: (i) a pre-signing phase and (ii) a post-signing go-
shop period. The Original Merger Consideration was the product of the pre-signing phase, and 
the evidence established that it was below fair value. Three factors contributed to this outcome: 
(i) the use of an LBO pricing model to determine the Original Merger Consideration, which had 
the effect in this case of undervaluing the Company, (ii) the compelling evidence of a significant 




i. The LBO Pricing Model 
The first factor that undermined the persuasiveness of the Original Merger Consideration was the 
use [*90]  of an LBO pricing model. HN22  Delaware case law recognizes that the highest price 
a bidder is willing to pay is not the same as fair value. See, e.g., Appraisal of Orchard, 2012 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 165, 2012 WL 2923305, at *5. Although the Delaware Supreme Court has 
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recognized that "[a] merger price resulting from arms-length negotiations . . . is a very strong 
indication of fair value," it has also cautioned that the merger price "must be accompanied by 
evidence tending to show that it represents the going concern value of the company rather than 
just the value of the company to one specific buyer." M.P.M. Enters., 731 A.2d at 797. The fact 
that a board has extracted the most that a particular buyer (or type of buyer) will pay does not 
mean that the result constitutes fair value. 
In this case, the Committee only engaged during the pre-signing phase with financial sponsors. 
When proposing an MBO, a financial sponsor determines whether and how much to bid by using 
an LBO model, which solves for the range of prices that a financial sponsor can pay while still 
achieving particular IRRs.24  What the sponsor is willing to pay diverges from fair value 
because of (i) the financial sponsor's need to achieve IRRs of 20% or more to satisfy its own 
investors and (ii) limits on the amount of leverage that [*91]  the company can support and the 
sponsor can use to finance the deal.25  Although a DCF methodology and an LBO model use 
similar inputs, they solve for different variables: "[T]he DCF analysis solves for the present 
value of the firm, while the LBO model solves for the internal rate of return." Donald M. 
DePamphilis, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Other Restructuring Activities 506 (7th ed. 2014). The 
Company concedes that an LBO model is not "oriented toward solving for enterprise value." 
Dkt. 373 at 27. Sell-side financial advisors can use an LBO model to predict with a high degree 
of accuracy the range of offers that a target corporation can expect from financial sponsors.26  
The factual record in this case demonstrates that the price negotiations during the pre-signing 
phase were driven by the financial sponsors' willingness to pay based on their LBO pricing 
models, rather than the fair value of the Company. JPMorgan, Goldman, and Evercore advised 
the Committee that the financial sponsors would determine how much to pay by solving for their 
required IRRs using an LBO pricing model. In an October 2012 presentation to the Committee, 
JPMorgan advised the Committee that 
• "Financial buyers evaluate investments with an internal rate of return (IRR) analysis, which 
measures return on equity"; 
• "Multiple of cash invested (e.g. 2.0x) is also a key parameter, particularly for larger 
transactions"; 
• "IRR will be used as the primary means to determine the appropriate purchase price by [*93]  a 
sponsor. . . ." 
JX 137 at 19. JPMorgan did not anticipate competition from strategic bidders and told the 
Committee that "there was a low probability of strategic buyer interest in acquiring the 
Company." JX 137 at 3. When making its initial presentations to the Committee, JPMorgan did 
not include the results of its LBO pricing model in the football field of valuation observations, 
which was consistent with the fact that an LBO pricing model does not solve for fair value. JX 
162 at 15. 
Using the same set of projections for both a DCF analysis and an LBO analysis, JPMorgan 
showed why a financial sponsor would not be willing to pay an amount approaching the 
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Company's going-concern value. Using the September Case and a DCF analysis, JPMorgan 
valued the Company as a going concern at between $20 and $27 per share. But using the same 
projected cash flows in an LBO model, JPMorgan projected that a financial buyer's willingness 
to pay would max out at approximately $14.13 per share, because at higher prices, the sponsor 
could not achieve a minimum return hurdle of a 20% IRR over five years. That $14.13 figure 
also assumed the sponsor engaged in further recapitalizations of the Company. 
Assuming [*94]  a financial sponsor wanted to achieve IRRs in the range of 20% to 25%, 
JPMorgan placed the likely range of prices at $11.75 to $13.00, or $13.25 to $14.25 if the 
sponsor engaged in further recapitalizations of the Company. 
Even if a financial sponsor was willing to accept a lower IRR such that it "could have" paid more 
for the Company, JPMorgan concluded that an MBO "would not have been possible for the 
company" at prices of $19 or more because it would require a level of leverage "that you could 
not get in the marketplace." Rajkovic Dep. 106-07. The issue was not whether the financial 
sponsors credited management's projections. As JPMorgan's analysis showed, the very same 
projections generated lower prices when run through an LBO model than when analyzed using a 
DCF analysis. 
The factual record established that the financial sponsors behaved as the Committee's advisors' 
predicted. When Silver Lake and KKR provided their initial expressions of interest, they bid at 
the low end of what the LBO model suggested. Silver Lake proposed an all-cash transaction 
valued at between $11.22 and $12.16 a share, excluding shares held by Mr. Dell, and KKR 
proposed an all-cash transaction valued at between [*95]  $12.00 and $13.00 a share, excluding 
shares held by Mr. Dell and Southeastern. The financial sponsors opened at levels that gave them 
room to negotiate, while staying within the pricing parameters of their models. 
When advising the Committee about what to do next, JPMorgan recognized that financial 
sponsors use similar LBO models. JPMorgan told the Committee in December 2012 that "given 
comparable LP make-up and return hurdles," it was "unlikely to see any material difference" 
between Silver Lake's offer and what other financial sponsors would pay. JX 226 at 22. When 
Evercore joined the sell-side team in January, it came to similar conclusions. At trial, JPMorgan's 
lead banker confirmed that LBO shops use essentially the same mode1.27  In other words, the 
outcome of competition between financial sponsors primarily depends on their relative 
willingness to sacrifice potential IRR. It does not lead to intrinsic value. 
As the pre-signing process unfolded, Silver Lake continued to base its bids on its LBO model. 
Durban [*97]  agreed that Silver Lake determined what to bid using a model that calculated the 
maximum price Silver Lake could pay and still hit its IRR target. Silver Lake was "not concerned 
at all . . . with the intrinsic value analysis of the business." Durban Dep. 12. Silver Lake analyzed 
the Company's value only to "understand how [its] actual investment [would] perform." Id. 
Silver Lake similarly did not form any view about whether the market price of the Company's 
common stock reflected the Company's fair value as a going concern. 
Mr. Dell did not focus on fair value either. He initially went along for the ride and agreed to 
invest his capital alongside Silver Lake at whatever price it was willing to pay. Tr. 465-467 (Mr. 
Dell). But when the Committee eventually insisted on $13.65 per share and Silver Lake balked, 
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Mr. Dell agreed to invest at a lower valuation of $13.36 to make the higher price work for Silver 
Lake and preserve his control over the post-transaction entity. 
Even the Committee did not focus on fair value. In the proxy statement, the directors disclosed 
that the "Committee did not seek to determine a pre-merger going concern value for the 
Common Stock to determine the fairness [*98]  of the merger consideration to the Company's 
unaffiliated stockholders." JX 532 at 71. The Committee instead negotiated based on a variety of 
metrics, including what the LBO models prepared by its financial advisors indicated was the 
most that Silver Lake would pay. As a practical matter, the Committee negotiated without 
determining the value of its best alternative to a negotiated acquisition. 
After Silver Lake raised its bid to $12.90 per share in January 2013, Evercore calculated that if 
the Company performed consistent with the September Case, then at the price it was offering, 
Silver Lake would achieve a 5-year IRR of 45% and generate a 5.3x multiple on its invested 
capital, even if Silver Lake exited in five years at the same transaction multiple. Mr. Dell would 
achieve a 5-year IRR of 50.1% and generate a 6.2x multiple on his invested capital. Evercore 
calculated that if the Company performed consistent with the BCG 25% Case, which the 
Committee believed was most likely, then Silver Lake would achieve a 5-year IRR of 39.8% and 
generate a 4.5x multiple on its invested capital. Mr. Dell would achieve a 5-year IRR of 44.7% 
and generate a 5.3x multiple on his invested capital. After [*99]  receiving this advice, the 
Committee advised the Board that it would "target a sale price of $13.75 per share, with $13.60 
per share as the minimum sale price for agreeing to a deal." JX 315 at 2. Silver Lake eventually 
offered $13.65 per share, which the Committee accepted. 
This was not a case in which the Buyout Group intended to make changes in the Company's 
business, either organically or through acquisitions. The Buyout Group intended to achieve its 
returns simply by executing the Company's existing business strategy and meeting its forecasted 
projections. Mr. Dell identified for the Committee the strategies that he would pursue once the 
Company was private, and the record establishes that all of them could have been accomplished 
in a public company setting. BCG recognized and advised the Committee that the only benefits 
Mr. Dell could realize by taking the Company private that were not otherwise available as a 
public company were accessing offshore cash with less tax leakage (to pay down the acquisition 
debt) and arbitraging the value of the Company itself by buying low and selling high.28  
Taken as a whole, the foregoing evidence, along with other evidence in the record, establishes 
that the Original Merger Consideration was dictated by what a financial sponsor could pay and 
still [*101]  generate outsized returns. This fact is a strong indication that the Original Merger 
Consideration undervalued the Company as a going concern. 
 
 
ii. The Valuation Gap 
A second factor that undermined the persuasiveness of the Original Merger Consideration as 
evidence of fair value was the widespread and compelling evidence of a valuation gap between 
the market's perception and the Company's operative reality. The gap was driven by (i) analysts' 
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focus on short-term, quarter-by-quarter results and (ii) the Company's nearly $14 billion 
investment in its transformation, which had not yet begun to generate the anticipated results. A 
transaction which eliminates stockholders may take advantage of a trough in a company's 
performance or excessive investor pessimism about the Company's prospects (a so-called anti-
bubble). Indeed, the optimal time to take a company private is after it has made significant long-
term investments, but before those investments have started to pay off and market participants 
have begun to incorporate those benefits into the price of the Company's stock.29  In Glassman 
v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001), HN23  the Delaware Supreme Court 
acknowledged that an appraisal proceeding can and should address the problem of 
opportunistic [*102]  timing: 
The determination of fair value must be based on all relevant factors, including damages and 
elements of future value, where appropriate. So, for example, if the merger was timed to take 
advantage of a depressed market, or a low point in the company's cyclical earnings, or to precede 
an anticipated positive development, the appraised value may be adjusted to account for those 
factors. 
Id. at 248; cf. Del. Open MRI Radiology Assocs., P.A. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290, 314-15 (Del. 
Ch. 2006) (Strine, V.C.) ("Obviously, when a business has opened a couple of facilities and has 
plans to replicate those facilities as of the merger date, the value of its expansion plans must be 
considered in determining fair value. To hold otherwise would be to subject our appraisal 
jurisprudence to just ridicule. The dangers for the minority arguably are most present when the 
controller knows that the firm is on the verge of break-through growth, having gotten the hang of 
running the first few facilities, and now being well-positioned to replicate its success at 
additional locations—think McDonald's or Starbucks."). 
Proposing an MBO when the stock price is low has the further effect of using the depressed 
stock price to anchor price negotiations.30  Empirical evidence confirms the experiential insight 
that both targets and acquirers use the market price of the target's stock as a reference point in 
formulating a bid.31  When a company with a depressed market price starts a sale process, the 
anchoring effect makes the process intuitively more likely to generate an undervalued bid. 
Market myopia can accentuate this problem.32  Investors focused on short-term, quarterly 
results can excessively discount the value of long-term investments.33  
The record at trial demonstrated that a significant valuation gap, investor myopia, and anchoring 
were all present in this case. Mr. Dell identified the opportunity to take the Company private 
after the stock market failed to reflect the Company's going concern value over a prolonged 
period. He managed the Company for the long-term and understood that his strategic decisions 
would drive the stock price down in the short-term. The Company's management team 
recognized the valuation gap as early as January 2011, when they prepared a sum-of-the-parts 
analysis that valued the company at between $22.49 and $27.05 per share and its stock was 
trading around $14 per share. The Committee's advisors reached a similar [*109]  conclusion. In 
October 2012, Dell's stock was trading between $9 and $10 per share, yet JPMorgan generated 
multiple valuation methodologies that implied a fundamental valuation exceeding that price, and 
its DCF analysis valued the Company at between $20 and $27 per share. Goldman 
contemporaneously observed that that its "[i]llustrative standalone valuation analyses result in 
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[Dell] value outcomes that are significantly higher than the current share price." JX 170 at 4-6. 
BCG made the same observation, commenting that the Company's "low valuation does not 
match apparent company strengths and reflects investor concerns." JX 344 at 42 (emphasis 
removed). 
It bears emphasizing that unlike other situations that this court has confronted,34  there is no 
evidence that Mr. Dell or his management team sought to create the valuation disconnect so that 
they could take advantage of it. To the contrary, they tried to convince the market that the 
Company was worth more. Only when the gap persisted despite their efforts, and after both 
Southeastern and Silver Lake suggested the possibility of an MBO to Mr. Dell, did he eventually 
decide to pursue the opportunity that the market price was presenting. 
As Mr. Dell and the Committee's advisors recognized, the valuation gap existed because Dell's 
stockholders were focused on the short-term. Mr. Dell made clear that he was investing in the 
Company for the long-term. The Company spent nearly $14 billion in acquisitions in the three 
years preceding the Merger as part of Mr. Dell's transformation strategy. Mr. Dell told the Board 
that to "[e]xpect [the] short term to be very challenging" and that the 
transformation [*111]  strategy would require "sacrific[ing] short term results." JX 96 at 2. He 
also believed the plan was working and would fuel longterm growth. Mr. Dell made the same 
points publicly. In May 2013, he explained at an analysts' conference that 
[i]n recent years, Dell has emerged as a new company. We have our strongest-ever product and 
services portfolio, and have acquired significant new skills and capabilities, reorganized our 
operations, optimized our global supply chain and put in place a world-class management team. . 
. . Today's Dell is a customer-inspired end-to-end solutions provider. One that has evolved from 
a PC manufacturer to a true IT solutions partner — one that offers a differentiated view of the 
enterprise. 
JX 530 at 6. In September 2012, management again stressed that it was pursuing "a longterm 
strategy [that] will take time." JX 109 at 7. Mr. Dell stated: "We're transforming our business, 
not for a quarter or a fiscal year, but to deliver differentiated customer value for the long term." 
JX 110 at 1. 
The Committee's advisors recognized the disconnect. In one presentation, JPMorgan noted that 
"[m]issed Street expectations have put investors in a 'wait and see mode' with increased focus on 
quarter-by-quarter [*112]  execution and improved visibility." JX 137 at 7. In another, JPMorgan 
observed that "[l]imited visibility and missed Street expectations appear to have led to increased 
investor focus on near-term execution." JX 226 at 5. Goldman cited a series of reasons for the 
disconnect, including that 
Companies at the center of industries undergoing major structural changes often suffer from 
depressed valuations that seem "disconnected" from fundamentals 
— Many investors believe that the shift to mobile computing represents a significant disruption 
to the traditional desktop and "notebook" ecosystem 
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— Investors are often reluctant to fight strong "secular headwinds" even when values become 
attractive in absolute and relative terms; as a result, valuations can remain depressed for 
protracted periods. 
JX 170 at 6. BCG similarly observed that the Company's low valuation reflected "investor 
concerns." JX 344 at 42. 
During the sale process, despite the Company's depressed and erratic stock price, the Committee 
and its advisors used the Company's market price as a key input. In fact, trading price was the 
only quantitative metric the Committee cited in the Company's proxy statements when 
explaining its recommendation [*113]  that stockholders approve the Merger. The Committee 
noted that it had not considered net book value, comparable transactions, or "a pre-merger going 
concern value" because it believed "that the trading price of the Common Stock at any given 
time represents the best available indicator of the Company's going concern value at that time." 
JX 532 at 71 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the proxy statement cited only metrics based on the 
trading price, including (i) the approximately 44% premium over the one-day trading price of 
$9.64 per share on November 11, 2012, they day before an analyst report first suggested that the 
Company might be a target for an LBO, (ii) the approximately 28% premium over the unaffected 
one-day trading price of $10.88 per share on January 11, 2013, the last trading day before media 
outlets leaked news of the Merger, and (iii) the approximately 39% premium over the average 
trading price of $9.97 per share during the ninety days preceding January 11. The Committee 
also cited the "the current and historical market prices of the Common Stock, including the 
market performance of the Common Stock relative to the common stock of other participants in 
the industries in [*114]  which the Company operates and general market indices" as proof of the 
Final Merger Consideration's fairness. JX 654 at 57. 
In the proxy statement, the Committee also cited its financial advisors' opinions. The summary of 
JPMorgan's work identified two DCF valuations: one derived from the BCG Base Case, which 
valued the Company at between $11.25 and $15.00 per share, and one derived from the BCG 
25% Case, which valued the Company at between $13.00 and $17.50 per share. 
But JPMorgan provided significantly more data for its market-based approaches, which included 
the Company's 52-week trading range, enterprise value as a function of the Company's EBITDA 
multiple using four sets of projections, and enterprise value as a function of the Company's 
earnings multiple using four sets of projections. JPMorgan also compared the premium over 
market to similar premiums offered in other large LBOs. Evercore relied almost entirely on the 
"non-DCF elements of [its] analysis," which were primarily market-based. Tr. 408 (Hiltz). They 
included the Company's 52-week trading range, analyst twelve-month price targets, the present 
value of the Company's future stock price, and comparisons of the Merger's [*115]  premium 
over market to other large deals. 
Taken as a whole, the foregoing evidence, along with other evidence in the record, establishes 
the existence of a significant valuation gap between the market price of the Company's common 
stock and the intrinsic value of the Company. The anti-bubble both facilitated the MBO and 
undermined the reliability of the market price as a measure of the Company's value. In reaching 
this finding, I recognize that "[t]here is virtually no CEO in America who does not believe that 
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the market is not valuing her company properly." Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 327 
(Del. Ch. 2000) (Strine, V.C.). In this case, however, the evidence of a significant valuation gap 
was both extensive and compelling. 
 
 
iii. Limited Pre-Signing Competition 
A third factor that undermined the persuasiveness of the Original Merger Consideration as 
evidence of fair value was the lack of meaningful price competition during the pre-signing phase. 
Go-shops in MBO transactions rarely produce topping bids,35  so the bulk of any price 
competition occurs before the deal is signed.36  The competition does not have to be direct and 
overt; and the prospect of post-signing competition can help raise the prices offered during the 
pre-signing phase.37  But the shadow [*116]  of competition is more spectral and less 
efficacious than its reality: "Whether it should be so or not, human beings often value things—
even other human beings like romantic partners—more when others might claim them."38  
Moreover, as discussed below, the similarities among financial bidders make them particularly 
susceptible to the winner's curse during a go-shop phase. See infra Part II.A.3.b.ii.b. There is also 
the "reality that there is not a culture of rampant topping among the larger private equity players, 
who have relationships with each other that might inhibit such behavior."39  The price 
established during the pre-signing phase is therefore critical, and it is the presence or realistic 
threat of competition during this period that drives up the price.40  
In this case, the record established that there was minimal competition during the pre-signing 
phase. The Committee initially engaged with only two financial sponsors, and KKR dropped out 
after providing its initial expression of interest. At that point, the Committee brought in TPG, but 
that firm dropped out as well. It is certainly true, as the Company argues, that the decisions that 
KKR and TPG made can be viewed as indicating that the Company was risky and difficult to 
value, but it also left the Committee negotiating with a single bidder. The Committee did not 
engage with Blackstone before signing, even though Blackstone approached the Company in 
January about a possible transaction. 
During the pre-signing [*123]  phase, the Committee did not contact any strategic buyers. HP 
was the obvious choice, and Evercore would later estimate that a deal between the Company and 
HP could generate between $3 and 4 billion in annual cost savings. Evercore doubted whether 
any other strategic bidders could acquire the Company given its size, and JPMorgan doubted that 
any strategic bidders would be interested. A direct, pre-signing outreach to HP therefore might 
well have been warranted. The Committee chose not to contact HP. The lack of any outreach to 
strategic bidders and the assessment that strategic interest was unlikely meant that the financial 
sponsors did not have to push their prices upward to pre-empt potential interest from that 
direction. 
Without a meaningful source of competition, the Committee lacked the most powerful tool that a 
seller can use to extract a portion of the bidder's anticipated surplus. The Committee had the 
ability to say no, and it could demand a higher price, but it could not invoke the threat of an 
alternative deal. When the Committee made its final demand, Silver Lake stood firm. It was Mr. 
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Dell who bridged the gap by accepting a lower valuation for his rollover shares. 
Although [*124]  he sacrificed some value by doing so, Evercore's analysis indicates that it was a 
good decision, and that he stands to enjoy greater returns than Silver Lake. 
Taken as a whole, the foregoing evidence, along with other evidence in the record, establishes 
that there was a lack of meaningful price competition during the pre-signing phase. This factor 
undermined the reliability of the Original Merger Consideration as a measure of the Company's 
value, and because the offers received in the go-shop period keyed off the Original Merger 
Consideration, this factor also undermines the reliability of the Final Merger Consideration. 
 
 
b. The Post-Signing Phase 
Although the evidence proved that the Original Merger Consideration was not the best evidence 
of fair value, the sale process did not stop there. The process entered a second phase, during 
which Evercore conducted a go-shop. Two higher bids emerged, one from Blackstone and 
another from Icahn. Blackstone eventually withdrew its bid, but Icahn continued to compete. 
When it appeared that stockholders would vote down the original deal, the Committee and the 
Buyout Group amended the Merger Agreement. The amendment provided for the Final Merger 
Consideration, [*125]  representing an increase of 23 cents, or 2%, over the Original Merger 
Consideration. 
Based on this evidence, the Company makes a straightforward argument: Capitalists want to 
make money, and America is full of capitalists, so it is counterintuitive and illogical—to the 
point of being incredible—to think that another party would not have topped Mr. Dell and Silver 
Lake if the Company was actually worth more. In my view, this argument has force for large 
valuation gaps, and is sufficiently persuasive to negate the valuation of $28.61 per share that the 
petitioners advanced. If the Company was really worth more than double what the Buyout Group 
was paying, then a strategic bidder like HP would have recognized a compelling opportunity and 
intervened. 
But the go-shop process was not sufficiently persuasive to rule out smaller valuation gaps. 
Financial sponsors—the only parties who showed interest in this case—faced the same leverage 
constraints and IRR hurdles as the Buyout Group, and the record demonstrated that a buyer using 
a leverage-based model would not bid high enough to generate fair value. The fact that two 
competing financial sponsors proposed higher-valued, debt-fueled alternatives [*126]  indicates 
that the Original Merger Consideration was low, even when evaluated from the standpoint of the 
returns that a leverage-based model could generate. The topping bids also exceeded the Final 
Merger Consideration. They not only help confirm that the Original Merger Consideration did 
not provide fair value, but they also undercut the notion that the Final Merger Consideration 
provided fair value. 
Although the go-shop phase in this case did increase the amount of consideration that the 
Company's stockholders received, that fact did not establish that the stockholders received fair 
value either. In this case, it demonstrated only that the stockholders received an amount closer to 
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the highest price that a bidder whose valuation was derived from and dependent on an LBO 
model was willing to pay. 
 
 
i. The Results of the Go-Shop 
The actual results of the go-shop process provide a starting place for analysis. To the good, it did 
generate two higher indications of interest for the whole Company. Blackstone, one of the 
world's largest and most sophisticated financial institutions, proposed to acquire the Company in 
a transaction that would give the Company's existing stockholders a choice between [*127]  a 
cash payment of at least $14.25 per share or shares in a new entity valued at $14.25 per share, 
subject to a cap on the total amount of equity that the new entity would issue. Icahn, also a 
financially strong and highly sophisticated M&A player, proposed a similar transaction in which 
stockholders would receive a combination of cash and stock, subject to a cap on the amount of 
cash. Evercore valued Icahn's proposal at between $13.37 and $14.42 per share. Both 
transactions contemplated continuing the Company's operating business and generating returns 
predominantly through financial engineering. Blackstone may have contemplated selling the 
Company's financing arm to help pay down the acquisition debt. 
As previously discussed, MBO go-shops rarely generate topping bids. Given that fact, for two 
higher bids to have emerged suggests that the Original Merger Consideration was relatively low. 
That conclusion is consistent with the evidence and the analysis of the pre-signing process 
conducted above. The fact that two higher bids emerged from financial sponsors suggests that 
the Original Merger Consideration was sufficiently low to enable other firms to be competitive 
when using similar leveraged-pricing [*128]  models. Both Blackstone and Icahn were financial 
sponsors, and both were proposing leveraged transactions. Each planned to lever up a still-public 
company, return the resulting cash to the public stockholders, and keep a public stub outstanding, 
but the underlying financial engineering paralleled what the Buyout Group was proposing. Both 
topping bidders were therefore constrained by the LBO model, both in terms of limits on the 
availability of leverage and the pricing necessary to generate the required IRRs over the 
anticipated investment period. The fact that they emerged indicates that the Original Merger 
Consideration was low not only when judged against a fair value metric, but also when judged 
by an LBO model. 
In this case, therefore, one evidentiary implication of the results of the go-shop is to reinforce the 
conclusion that the Original Merger Consideration did not equate to fair value. It has similar 
evidentiary implications for the Final Merger Consideration. Although Blackstone later withdrew 
its bid, Icahn continued to advance its proposal. When it appeared that stockholders would vote 
down the Merger if all the Buyout Group offered was the Original Merger 
Consideration, [*129]  the Buyout Group increased its price. The question then becomes whether 
the increase was sufficient to establish the Final Merger Consideration as fair value. This 
decision finds that the answer is "no." 
As during the pre-signing process, competition from a financial sponsor might have induced the 
Buyout Group to increase its bid within the confines of the LBO model, but it did not lead to 
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competition at a level indicative of fair value. When it appeared that stockholders would vote 
down the deal, the Buyout Group increased its offer by 23 cents, or approximately 2% of the 
Original Merger Consideration. The 2% bump is consistent with an increase within the confines 
of the LBO model. Notably, both Blackstone's proposal and the upper range of Icahn's proposal 
exceeded the Final Merger of what the company should have yielded in a genuinely competitive 
process." Glob. GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc. (Golden Telecom I), 993 A.2d 497, 508-09 (Del. 
Ch. 2010) (Strine, V.C.), aff'd, 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010). 
The 2% increase that the Buyout Group offered to secure a favorable vote was all that the go-
shop process achieved. Given the evidence that the pre-signing phase did not generate a price 
that was equivalent to fair value, and in light of the nature of the competition that took place 
during the go-shop phase, [*130]  the 2% bump was not sufficient to prove that the Final Merger 
Consideration was the best evidence of fair value. 
 
 
ii. Other Reasons Why The Go-Shop Did Not Induce Greater Competition 
As previously discussed, MBO go-shops rarely generate topping bids. At trial, Subramanian 
gave persuasive testimony about various factors that generally limit the efficacy of MBO go-
shops, and he explained why those factors were present to a significant degree in this case. 
Notably, the framework for analyzing the go-shop is not the standard that would apply in a 
fiduciary duty case, viz. whether the go-shop was preclusive or whether the decision to include 
the structure fell within the range of reasonableness. In other words, the operative question is not 
answered by showing that a particularly strong and determined bidder could overcome the 
structural and functional disincentives and make a topping bid, meaning that that the go-shop 
was not preclusive, nor by explaining why a transaction that included a go-shop was a 
proportionate means of pursuing the best transaction reasonably available for the stockholders, 
regardless of whether or not it actually succeeded, meaning that the go-shop fell within 
the [*131]  range of reasonableness. The question for appraisal is whether the Company showed 
that the structure in fact generated a price that persuasively established the Company's fair value. 
Subramanian discussed why MBO go-shops, although generally legitimate from the standpoint 
of fiduciary duty analysis, can function inadequately for purposes of price discovery. His 
analysis demonstrates why a bidder—and particularly a financial sponsor—would choose not to 
intervene in a go-shop, even if it meant theoretically leaving money on the table by allowing the 
initial bidder to secure an asset at a beneficial price. 
At the heart of Subramanian's analysis is the recognition that before making a bid, a potential 
overbidder will evaluate whether it has a realistic pathway to success. 
[I]n this chess game of M&A, most of these parties being very sophisticated, don't just think 
incrementally one step ahead. They're thinking two, three, four, five moves ahead. Any third 
party looking at this would say, "What is my pathway to success"? So even if you value this 
thing at a very high number, you might reasonably say there's no pathway to success and, 
therefore, I'm not going to start on this process because there's [*132]  no finish line. 
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Tr. 811 (Subramanian). The pathway to success must be sufficiently realistic to warrant incurring 
the time and expense to become involved in a contested situation, as well as the potential damage 
to professional relationships and reputation from intervening and possibly being unsuccessful. 
 
 
a) Structural Issues 
The structure of the go-shop is an obvious factor that affects a participant's pathway to success. 
In a presentation in January 2013, Evercore gave the Committee the following advice about 
various structural aspects: 
• "A longer go-shop period increases the amount of time that potential third parties have to 
evaluate a possible transaction." 
—"The complexity of a transaction and the current industry and market conditions can 
potentially impact the duration of a go-shop." 
• "A lower termination fee in effect during the go-shop period reduces the value leakage to 
shareholders." 
—"A superior proposal needs to overcome the implied termination fee per share in addition to 
providing incremental value to shareholders." 
—"If a transaction is not consummated, shareholders bear the cost of the termination fee." 
• "Broader definitions of what constitutes a superior proposal gives [*133]  more latitude to the 
Special Committee." 
• "Matching rights, unless limited, serve to discourage bidders and should be avoided." 
JX 301 at 18. Subramanian generally focused on the same structural features. 
With the benefit of advice from Evercore, the Committee negotiated a go-shop that raised fewer 
structural barriers than the norm. One critical issue is the length of the go-shop period, which 
defines the amount of time that a bidder has to understand the target company and decide 
whether to proceed. The issue is more complex than simply counting the number of days that the 
go-shop provides. An equally important factor is what a bidder must do before the end of the go-
shop period to be defined as an "Excluded Party," which is the status that allows the bidder to 
continue negotiating with the target after the go-shop time period runs out and still receive the 
benefit of a lower termination fee. More flexible go-shops only require an acquirer to provide a 
non-binding indication of interest in a transaction that could lead to a Superior Proposal, and they 
define the concept of "Superior Proposal" broadly. More restrictive go-shops demand more, such 
as a bona fide offer that qualifies as [*134]  a Superior Proposal, a fully financed bid, or even a 
fully negotiated merger agreement. A nominally shorter go-shop that requires less to qualify as 
an Excluded Party may be more open as a practical matter than a nominally longer go-shop that 
imposes tougher criteria for Excluded Party status. The sufficiency of the amount of time also 
58 
 
varies with the size and complexity of the target. A deal involving a bigger and more complex 
target requires more diligence, is more difficult to finance, and may require the bidder to 
assemble a consortium, which takes additional time. 
In this case, the structure of the go-shop was relatively open. The length of the go-shop period 
was forty-five days, which Subramanian testified was "about average" for the sample deals he 
studied. Tr. 786 (Subramanian). The steps required to become an "Excluded Party" were also 
relatively few: A bidder only needed to submit a letter with a general outline of the structure of a 
transaction sufficient for the Committee to conclude that it "is or could reasonably be expected to 
result in a Superior Proposal." JX 349 § 5.3(i). A party who satisfied that standard would achieve 
Excluded Party status and could continue to negotiate [*135]  with the Committee, theoretically 
until stockholders approved the deal. In this case, an Excluded Party at the end of the forty-five 
day go-shop period would have had another four months before the special meeting, originally 
scheduled for July 18. 
Other structural features of the go-shop were also relatively flexible. The termination fee during 
the go-shop period for an Excluded Party was $180 million, representing approximately 1% of 
equity value of the original deal and 40% of the $450 termination fee that otherwise would 
apply. An Evercore banker testified that usually the lowered termination fee is half of the base 
termination fee, so the Merger Agreement was a little better on that score. More importantly, the 
Merger Agreement only contemplated a single opportunity for the Buyout Group to match a 
higher bid, after which the match right in the Merger Agreement expired. The one-time match is 
more favorable to a topping bidder than an unlimited match right, which is a powerful 
disincentive.41  At the same time, it presents more of a hurdle than simple information rights. 
See Go-Shops vs. No-Shops, supra, at 760. 
The main structural problem that Subramanian identified did not result from the terms of the go-
shop in the abstract, but rather stemmed from the size and complexity of the Company. The 
Merger was twenty-five times larger than any transaction in Subramanian's sample of "jumped" 
deals, meaning that a successful topping bid literally would have [*139]  been unprecedented. 
The extent of Blackstone's efforts gives a sense of what was required. To get to Excluded Party 
status, Blackstone had to spend in excess of $25 million and assemble a due diligence team that 
filled a ballroom, and Blackstone is one of the world's most sophisticated private equity firms. 
Blackstone also retained Dell's former head of M&A and strategy, Dave Johnson, to lead its 
acquisition team and had the benefit of his insights. 
At bottom, the evidence in this case shows that it was possible to achieve Excluded Party status. 
Blackstone, Icahn, and GE Capital all provided initial expressions of interest within the forty-
five day go-shop period. But that does not mean that the magnitude of the task did not have a 
chilling effect on other parties. The size and complexity of the Company remains a factor for 
purposes of analyzing the go-shop. 
 
 
b) The Winner's Curse 
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A far more significant problem with MBO go-shops is that incumbent management has the best 
insight into the Company's value, or at least is perceived to have an informational advantage. 
Competing bidders therefore face threat of the winner's curse: 
As a third party, the implication is if you bid and you win, you've [*140]  just learned that you 
think this company is worth more than management. Now, maybe you're really smart. Maybe 
you have some source of synergy or something else that makes you smarter than management; 
but absent that kind of edge, . . . you'd have to say to yourself "I've almost certainly overpaid 
because the inside bidder, they looked at my offer and they decided not to match it. So either I'm 
very smart, smarter than the inside people," which [is] unlikely to be the case, "or I've just 
overpaid." 
Tr. 782-83 (Subramanian). 
Bidders can compensate for information asymmetries by conducting due diligence, by using their 
own independent industry knowledge, or by hiring expert advisors. Strategic buyers are less 
subject to the winner's curse because they typically possess industry-specific expertise and have 
asset-specific valuations that incorporate synergies. Financial sponsors are "much more 
concerned about a winner's curse" because they price deals using similar financial models and 
seek to generate value from portfolio companies using similar techniques. Tr. 783 
(Subramanian). "Just as Person B would not want to bid against Person A for the contents of 
Person A's wallet, no financial [*141]  buyer would want to bid against a financial buyer 
working with management." Denton, supra, at 1546. 
In this case, the threat of the winner's curse rendered questionable the existence of a pathway to 
success. As the Company's founder and longtime CEO, Mr. Dell knew more about the Company 
than anyone else. Before any bidder would become involved, they had to have a strategy for 
dealing with Mr. Dell's superior knowledge. 
For those bidders who became involved during the go-shop period, the Committee sought to 
address the information asymmetry issue by providing extensive due diligence. Although 
Blackstone had to push for certain information that Silver Lake was given voluntarily, all of the 
bidders received access to the data they requested. The Committee and Evercore also ensured 
that Mr. Dell was available. Mr. Dell personally provided all of the bidders with management 
presentations, and he ultimately spent more time with Blackstone than any of the other 
participants, including Silver Lake. The record provided no reason to harbor any concern about 
Mr. Dell's level of cooperation or responsiveness. 
In the end, for the bidders who actually engaged during the go-shop period, the Committee 
appears to have addressed [*142]  the problem of information asymmetry and the risk of the 
winner's curse as best they could. The problems are endemic to MBO go-shops and create a 
powerful disincentive for any competing bidder—and particularly competing financial bidders—
to get involved. It can happen, as Blackstone and Icahn demonstrated, but practical hurdles make 





c) Mr. Dell's Value To The Company And Role In The Buyout Group 
A third impediment to competitive bidding was Mr. Dell's value to the Company. Subramanian 
showed that the Company's relationship with Mr. Dell was an asset in itself. To illustrate Mr. 
Dell's value, Subramanian conducted two event studies. He determined the stock price effect of 
Mr. Dell's departure from the Company in March 2004, and he measured the stock price effect of 
his return in 2007. Subramanian calculated that in March 2004, the Company lost $1.2 billion in 
market value. In January 2007, the Company gained $2.5 billion in market value. Subramanian 
concluded from these studies that Mr. Dell's association with the Company contributed 
significant value.42  
To perceive a path to success, a competing bidder had to account for Mr. Dell's value. Mr. Dell 
was part of the Buyout Group, so the incumbent party to the Merger Agreement had the benefit 
of that asset. A competing bidder that did not have Mr. Dell as part of its buyout group would be 
bidding for a company without that asset and would end up with a less valuable 
There was also the problem of Mr. Dell's financial incentives. He was a net purchaser in the 
transaction, meaning [*144]  he was buying more equity in the post-MBO Company than he was 
selling. Mr. Dell rolled over his entire 16% equity stake into the new company and contributed 
$750 million in cash. Through the transaction, he increased his ownership in Dell to 74.9%. 
Because Mr. Dell was a net purchaser, any increase in the deal price would cost him money. If 
Mr. Dell kept the size of his investment constant as the deal value increased, then Silver Lake 
would have to pay more and would demand a greater ownership stake in the post-transaction 
entity. Subramanian showed that if Mr. Dell wanted to maintain 75% ownership of the post-
transaction entity, then he would have to contribute an additional $250 million for each $1 
increase in the deal price.43  If Mr. Dell did not contribute any additional equity and relied on 
Silver Lake to fund the increase, then he would lose control of the post-transaction entity at a 
deal price above $15.73 pershare. Because Mr. Dell was a net buyer, any party considering an 
overbid would understand that a higher price would not be well received by the most important 
person at the Company. 
The Committee commendably tried to address Mr. Dell's role and the advantage that his 
participation conferred on the Buyout Group. In the confidentiality agreement that Mr. Dell 
signed, he agreed "to explore in good faith the possibility of working with any such potential 
counterparty or financing source if requested by the Committee; it being understood that your 
decision as to whether to work with any counterparty or financing [*146]  source after such good 
faith exploration shall be within your discretion." JX 125 at 2. The Company oversold this 
provision during the trial as a binding requirement that Mr. Dell work with any bidder, which it 
was not, but the contract term was nevertheless helpful. It could have been more specific,44  but 
it was better than no commitment at all. 
More importantly, the record indicated that Mr. Dell actually was willing to work with other 
buyout groups. Mr. Dell testified credibly on that point, and his contemporaneous actions during 
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the sale process were consistent with his testimony. In a different case in which a key 
employee [*147]  was less forthcoming, a comparable commitment might not be as persuasive. 
There is also evidence that Blackstone and Icahn did not regard Mr. Dell as essential to their 
bids. Blackstone explored alternative CEO candidates. Icahn described Mr. Dell as a negative 
factor in an open letter to stockholders: 
Perhaps the most important reason [the Silver Lake bid undervalues the Company] is Dell has a 
major liability that can be easily removed and that I believe would make the company a great 
deal of value. It is the CEO, Michael Dell. If Dell can replace Michael Dell, I think that the 
company would be worth far, far more. I do not say this facetiously. I fully expect to be able to 
identify a first class person to run Dell if our slate of directors are elected at the annual meeting. 
Dell, Inc., Carl C. Icahn Issues Open Letter to Stockholders of Dell (Schedule 14A) (July 29, 
2013). Icahn thought that "[a]ll would be swell at Dell if Michael and the board bid farewell." JX 
730 at 1. 
As with the other go-shop considerations, Mr. Dell's value to the Company and his association 
with the Buyout Group were impediments, but not insuperable ones. Exceptional bidders like 
Blackstone and Icahn could overcome [*148]  them, but Mr. Dell's unique value and his 




c. The Probative Value Of The Sale Process 
Taken as a whole, the Company did not establish that the outcome of the sale process offers the 
most reliable evidence of the Company's value as a going concern. The market data is sufficient 
to exclude the possibility, advocated by the petitioners' expert, that the Merger undervalued the 
Company by $23 billion. Had a value disparity of that magnitude existed, then HP or another 
technology firm would have emerged to acquire the Company on the cheap. What the market 
data does not exclude is an underpricing of a smaller magnitude, given that all of the participants 
constructed their bids based on a leveraged financing model and were limited by its constraints. 
 
 
B. The DCF Analysis As Evidence Of Fair Value 
HN24  The DCF analysis is a well-established method of determining the going concern value 
of a corporation. "[T]he DCF . . . methodology has featured prominently in this Court because it 
is the approach that merits the greatest confidence within the financial community." Owen v. 
Cannon, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 165, 2015 WL 3819204, at *16 (Del. Ch. June 17, 2015) 
(quotation marks omitted). 
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Put [*149]  in very simple terms, the basic DCF method involves several discrete steps. First, 
one estimates the values of future cash flows for a discrete period . . . . Then, the value of the 
entity attributable to cash flows expected after the end of the discrete period must be estimated to 
produce a so-called terminal value, preferably using a perpetual growth model. Finally, the value 
of the cash flows for the discrete period and the terminal value must be discounted back . . . . 
Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc., 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, 2005 WL 2045640, at *9 (Del. 
Ch. Aug. 19, 2005) (Strine, V.C.) (footnote omitted). 
The petitioners' expert, Professor Bradford Cornell, used a DCF analysis to opine that the 
Company had a fair value of $28.61 per share on the closing date. The respondent's expert, 
Professor Glenn Hubbard, used a DCF analysis to opine that the Company had a fair value of 
$12.68 per share on the closing date. Two highly distinguished scholars of valuation science, 
applying similar valuation principles, thus generated opinions that differed by 126%, or 
approximately $28 billion. This is a recurring problem. See Modern Appraisal Litigation, supra, 
at 19-20 (reviewing appraisal decisions and finding that "for respondents' experts, the median 
valuation was 16% below the merger price, and the mean was 22% below. For 
petitioners' [*150]  experts, the median valuation was 78% above the merger price, and the mean 
was 186% above."). This decision does not exhaustively describe the DCF methodology; it only 




The difference in the experts' DCF valuations was driven primarily by the projected cash flows 
they used. Cornell weighted equally the BCG 25% Case and the BCG 75% Case, effectively 
creating a BCG 50% Case. Cornell then gave equal weight to the BCG 50% Case and the Bank 
Case, with an additional $1 billion in cost savings added to the Bank Case. Hubbard used an 
adjusted version of the BCG 25% Case. Both experts regarded the July and September Cases as 
overly optimistic and, in any event, stale by the time of the Merger. 
Both experts treated the BCG 25% Case as reliable. BCG was an unbiased third-party expert. 
The Committee hired BCG to prepare a detailed set of forecasts that valued the Company as a 
going concern. BCG built its forecasts from the bottom up with input from management and took 
into account the Company's historical performance and Street projections. The forecasts 
comported with the evidence presented at trial, in that they projected [*151]  declining margins 
for the end-user computing business and increasing margins for the enterprise service and 
solutions business. The projections were impressively thorough, with over 1,100 specific 
assumptions. The resulting model was dynamic and transparent. The Committee, BCG, and J.P. 
Morgan regarded the BCG 25% Case as a realistic and achievable set of projections for the 
Company. 
For purposes of a valuation as of the Merger date, the BCG 25% Case has some weaknesses. The 
projections were prepared in January 2013 and never updated. The Company's actual operating 
income for FY 2014 was more than 36% below the BCG 25% Case. In addition, BCG's 
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projections for revenue from PC sales in FY 2015 and FY 2016 appeared high once IDC reported 
lower rates of PC shipments in August 2013. 
Hubbard adjusted the BCG 25% Case to account for these weaknesses. First, he updated the 
revenue projections to incorporate the results of the August 2013 IDC report, which implied a 
10% decline in shipments for desktop PCs and a 23% decline for notebook sales by FY 2017. 
These adjustments were reasonable and an appropriate means of addressing the concern that the 
BCG 25% Case had become stale by the time of the [*152]  closing date. To make these 
adjustments, Hubbard used current IDC data and maintained the dynamic model's mechanics, 
formula, and internal assumptions. Consistent with the Company's experience through closing, 
Hubbard maintained the Company's profit margins. 
Second, because of the adjustment to projected sales for the Company's primary products in the 
end-user computing business, Hubbard updated the revenues that would flow from sales of 
secondary products (i.e., the attachment rates). He relied on figures from the September Case to 
make the adjustment. 
Third, Hubbard adjusted for stock-based compensation. The experts agreed on the pre-tax figure 
for the adjustment. See also Merion Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 172, 
2013 WL 3793896, at *12 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2013) (collecting cases supporting treating stock-
based compensation as a non-cash expense). 
Fourth, Hubbard created a five-year transition period in the projections from FY 2018 through 
FY 2022. The resulting three-stage model better captured the operative reality of the Company 
and the likely schedule for the transformation plan to generate results. See Andaloro, 2005 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 125, 2005 WL 2045640, at *12-13 (adding a stage to create a three-tiered DCF so as 
to make the calculation of cash flows "a bit more explicit" and noting that "[a]s a 
general [*153]  matter, neither a [two stage nor a three stage DCF] is inherently preferable"). 
HN25  This court has expressed a preference for valuations "based on contemporaneously 
prepared management projections." Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, 
2004 WL 1152338, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2004). Generally speaking, our appraisal 
jurisprudence is skeptical of litigation-driven adjustments to management projections.45  In this 
case, however, Hubbard persuasively justified his changes, and this court has used adjusted 
projections when the expert has provided sufficient support for the modifications.46  The BCG 
25% Case with Hubbard's adjustments is a reliable set of forecasts for the Company. Given the 
Company's litigation incentives, however, it likely represents (on the margin) a relatively 
conservative forecast. 
Cornell also used the BCG 75% Case. The cost-savings in the BCG 75% Case bore few indicia 
of reliability. One was vaguely labeled "client reinvention initiative," which no one at trial 
explained. Due to the aggressive initiatives it contemplated, the BCG 75% Case "impl[ied] 
margins in fiscal year 2016 that are higher than those ever achieved by the Company or its 
principal competitors." JX 532 at 63-64. 
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Cornell also used the Bank Case. That set of projections was completed in September 2013, 
closer in time to the closing date than any of the other projections. HN26  It is a federal felony 
"to knowingly obtain any funds from a financial institution by false or fraudulent pretenses or 
representations," [*155]  which enhances the credibility of a set of projections that is provided to 
a financial institution. Del. Open MRI Radiology Assocs., P.A. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290, 317 
n.57 (Del. Ch. 2006) (Strine, V.C.) (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (2006)). Silver Lake prepared the 
projections, but Company management provided key inputs, and Mr. Dell implicitly approved 
the projections by endorsing them at a rating agency presentation. Hubbard regarded the 
projections as reasonable. 
At the same time, the Bank Case was relatively optimistic. Silver Lake's forecasts projected 
increasing margins for the PC business, despite the Company's near-term strategy of sacrificing 
margin to retain market share and market evidence showing a shift to low-margin value PCs. 
Silver Lake also based its projections on the private company status of the post-transaction 
entity. That is not a significant concern in this case, because the Buyout Group planned to 
continue managing the Company's business after closing using the same business plan, and the 
quantum of administrative savings resulting from no longer being a public company was not 
material to a corporation of the Company's magnitude. 
Hubbard adjusted the Bank Case to account for non-recurring restructuring expenses and for 
stock-based compensation. This decision adopts [*156]  these changes, as well as his adjustment 
factor. 
This decision concludes that there are two sets of reliable forecasts for the Company: Hubbard's 
adjusted BCG 25% Case, which was likely somewhat conservative, and Hubbard's adjusted 
Bank Case, which was likely somewhat optimistic. 
 
 
2. The Perpetuity Growth Rate For The Terminal Period 
Cornell used a perpetuity growth rate of 1%. Hubbard used 2%. This court has held that HN27  
"the rate of inflation is the floor for a terminal value estimate for a solidly profitable company 
that does not have an identifiable risk of insolvency." Glob. GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc. 
(Golden Telecom I), 993 A.2d 497, 511 (Del. Ch. 2010) (Strine, V.C.), aff'd, 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 
2010). Cornell's 1% perpetuity growth rate is lower than inflation. Even Hubbard's 2% growth 
rate is arguably too low. Given the Company's status as a mature Company whose growth rate 
should fall somewhere above inflation and close to GDP, a 3% rate could be more appropriate. 
See id. ("Generally, once an industry has matured, a company will grow at a steady rate that is 






The experts disagree about the appropriate tax rate to apply to the Company's cash flows. Cornell 
used a 21% tax rate throughout his [*157]  forecast period, which he drew from the September 
Case and the valuation models prepared by the Company's financial advisors. Hubbard used two 
different tax rates. He used a 17.8% tax rate during the projection and transition periods, which 
he drew from the report of a tax expert, Stephen Shay. He used the 35.8% marginal tax rate for 
the terminal period, which he justified with citations to academic literature. See, e.g., JX 896A \p 
222. 
The Company has not paid taxes at the marginal rate since at least 2000. In the five years leading 
up to the Merger, the Company paid taxes at effective rates that varied between 16.5% and 
29.2%. For the same period, the Company's cash tax rates (i.e., the amount of taxes actually paid 
in cash) ranged from 9.6% to 24.1%. 
The Company's low effective tax rate is due, in part, to its ability to defer payment of domestic 
taxes on income earned overseas. The Company has made an "indefinite reinvestment election," 
meaning that it has represented to its auditors that it intends to indefinitely reinvest its earnings 
overseas. Tr. 934 (Shay). The election allows the Company to defer paying U.S. taxes on 
approximately $19 billion in overseas profits. For its auditors [*158]  to approve this election, 
they needed "evidence of specific plans for reinvestment of undistributed earnings." Fin. 
Accounting Standards Bd., APB 23: Accounting for Income Taxes—Special Areas 4 (1972). At 
the time of the Merger, there was ample evidence to support the election.47  
The Company will never pay domestic taxes on profits attributable to offshore income unless and 
until it actually repatriates them. The only time the Company repatriated significant overseas 
income was in 2004 and 2013, [*159]  during U.S. tax holidays that made the repatriations 
effectively tax free. In 2004, the Company repatriated $4 billion. In 2013, it repatriated $9 
billion. The Company also had used earnings from foreign subsidiaries to facilitate intercompany 
transfers. 
The Company has not deviated from its representation that it will continue to reinvest its 
overseas earnings indefinitely in foreign projects. The Company instructed Houlihan Lokey, Inc. 
to use a 17% tax rate when conducting a post-closing valuation. Management told bidders during 
due diligence to expect the difference between the Company's effective tax rate and its cash rate 
to continue for the foreseeable future. Hubbard's model implies that, beginning in 2023, Dell will 
begin paying taxes on all of its global profits at the U.S. marginal tax rate of 35.8% and will 
continue doing so perpetually. The factual record establishes the opposite. In fact, it would be 
highly speculative for this court to choose a date when, contrary to its historical practice, the 
Company would begin to repatriate foreign earnings.48  Cornell's tax estimate is more reliable 
and consistent with the Company's operative reality.49  
 
 
4. The Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
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To discount the cash flow projections to their present value, the experts computed the Company's 
weighted average cost of capital ("WACC"). The parties dispute every input except for the risk-
free rate of 3.31%. The inputs selected [*161]  below generate a WACC of 9.46%. 
 
 
a. The Cost Of Debt 
The experts disagreed about the cost of debt. Before the Merger, the Company had an "A" credit 
rating. In May 2013, Standard & Poor's downgraded the Company's credit rating to "BBB" after 
poor first-quarter results. The "rating downgrade reflect[ed] significant deterioration in the 
operating performance of Dell's end user computing segment," not the impending buyout. JX 523 
at 2. As of October 29, 2013, long-term BBB rated bonds had a 4.95% yield to maturity. JX 
897A ^ 104. This decision adopts that rate as the cost of debt. 
 
 
b. Capital Structure 
The experts disagreed about the Company's capital structure. Cornell used the Company's pre-
announcement ratio of debt to total capitalization to conclude that 75.25% of the capital structure 
was equity. Hubbard used the Company's average ratio of equity to total capital calculated on a 
quarterly basis between January 12, 2011, and January 11, 2013, to conclude that 74.75% of 




The experts disagreed about beta. Cornell derived a beta of 1.35 by analyzing the Company's 
peers. Hubbard derived a beta of 1.31 by [*162]  analyzing weekly observations over a two-year 
period. A beta specific to the Company is more targeted than a blended beta calculated from peer 
companies, particularly when both experts opined that the Company had few peers. See Merion 
Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 172, 2013 WL 3793896, at *18 (Del. Ch. 
July 8, 2013). This decision uses Hubbard's beta. 
 
 
d. The Equity Risk Premium 
The experts disagreed about the appropriate equity risk premium. Cornell used a forward-looking 
equity risk premium of 5.50%. Hubbard used a blended historical and supply-side equity risk 
premium of 6.41%. This decision uses the supply-side equity risk premium of 6.11%. See 
Golden Telecom I, 993 A.2d at 516; see also Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., 2015 





5. Adjustments To Cash 
The experts agreed that excess cash should be added to the valuation, but they disagreed about 
how much cash was excess. At the time of the Merger, the Company had $11.040 billion in cash 
and $5.054 billion in debt on its balance sheet. After adding back $172 million in transaction-
related expenses, the Company had net cash of $6.158 billion. Cornell added the full amount of 
net cash to Dell's enterprise value. Hubbard made four deductions: (i) $3 billion for working 
capital, (ii) $2 billion for restricted cash, (iii) $2.24 billion for deferred taxes, [*163]  and (iv) $3 
billion for contingent taxes. 
 
 
a. Working Capital And Restricted Cash 
Working capital and restricted cash can be addressed together. The witness testimony and 
contemporaneous documentary evidence supported Hubbard's opinion that the Company 
required at least $3 billion in working capital. Silver Lake left $5.665 billion in cash on the 
balance sheet after closing. The $3 billion working capital figure is reasonable. 
Contemporaneous evidence also shows that the Company had $2 billion in restricted cash. A 
single adjustment is necessary, however, to account for a rating agency presentation in April 
2014, where the Company stated that it had obtained access to $0.8 billion in restricted cash 
before the Merger closed. 
This decision deducts working capital of $3 billion and restricted cash of $1.2 billion from the 
Company's available cash for purposes of determining its enterprise value. 
 
 
b. Deferred Taxes 
The experts disagreed about deferred taxes. Hubbard deducted $2.24 billion for deferred taxes 
attributable to the Company's foreign earnings and profits. This decision has already resolved 
this issue by accepting the Company's representation that it will reinvest its overseas 
earnings [*164]  indefinitely in overseas projects, meaning it will not have to pay any U.S. taxes 
on that income. If anything, this approach is conservative. The Company's CFO testified that the 
effective tax rate includes deferred taxes, and that the Company's cash tax rate is lower than the 
effective rate because the effective tax rate includes substantial deferred tax liabilities. In other 
words, the effective tax rate accounts for the deferred taxes, and because the Company never 
plans to repatriate those funds, a proper valuation would have to back out any deferred taxes on 





c. Liability From Unrecognized Tax Benefits 
Hubbard deducted a contingent liability of $3.01 billion from the Company's enterprise value for 
unrecognized tax benefits. Under FASB Interpretation No. 48 ("FIN 48"), a company must have 
a reserve on its balance sheet for unpaid taxes it may have to pay for taking a tax position on a 
prior return that may prove incorrect. See Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., FASB Interpretation 
No. 48: Accounting for Uncertainty in Income (2006) (codified as FASB Accounting Standards 
Codification 740-10-55-3). FIN [*165]  48 "requires the affirmative evaluation that it is more 
likely than not, based on the technical merits of a tax position, that an enterprise is entitled to 
economic benefits resulting from positions taken in income tax returns." Id. at 3-4. That is, the 
FIN 48 reserve measures the tax payment a company expects to pay if a taxing authority 
disagrees with its position even though it thinks it is more likely than not that its position is 
correct. The liability that Hubbard deducted equaled 100% of the Company's FIN 48 reserve. 
Subtracting the full FIN 48 liability from the Company's enterprise value would be excessive. 
Under penalty of law, Company and its advisors deemed it more likely than not that their prior 
tax positions were reasonable. Tr. 302, 314 (Sweet) (testifying that the full FIN 48 reserve 
remains on the Company's books and reflects "the best estimate" of Dell's FIN 48 liability and 
that outside advisors vet that position); see also Tr. 937-38 (Shay). Subtracting the $3.01 billion 
from the DCF would imply that this court better understands the merits of the Company's tax 
positions than the Company does—without even having the opportunity to look at the underlying 
tax positions. The [*166]  more persuasive view is that the Company and its auditors correctly 
determined the Company's tax positions. 
The analysis differs as to one item where Houlihan Lokey opined that it was "probable" and 
"reasonably estimable" that the Company would pay out $650 million from the FIN 48 reserve. 
JX 725 at 2, 11. That $650 million was "in the most mature stages of dispute resolution," and 
accordingly, it is reasonable to subtract it as a non-operating liability. Id. at 11. The Bank Case 
included the $650 million outflow in its projections. 
This decision deducts $650 million from the Company's excess cash. 
 
 
6. The Result Of The DCF Valuation 
This decision adopts the parties' agreed upon calculation of 1,765,369,276 fully diluted shares 
outstanding. Using Hubbard's adjusted BCG 25% Case, which was likely somewhat 
conservative, a DCF analysis that incorporates the foregoing inputs generates a fair value per 
share of $16.43. Using Hubbard's adjusted Bank Case, which was likely somewhat optimistic, a 
DCF analysis that incorporates the foregoing inputs generates a fair value per share of $18.81. 
Having no reason to prefer one realistic case over the other, this decision weights them equally. 
This approach has [*167]  the additional benefit of arriving at a cost-savings number that is 
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closest to management's best estimate of what the Company believed was attainable at the time 
of the Merger. In April 2014, after the Merger closed, the Company made a presentation to the 
rating agencies in which management stated that the Company had realized $1.6 billion in cost-
savings in FY 2014. See JX 807. The Bank Case assumed $2.6 billion in cost savings. Hubbard's 
adjusted BCG 25% case appears to have assumed approximately $660 million in savings. 
Averaging the two implies $1.63 billion in cost savings, which matches the figure management 
provided in April 2014. 
Giving equal weight to the two DCF valuations generates a fair value of $17.62 per share. 
 
 
C. The Relationship Between The DCF Valuation And The Merger Price 
The fair value generated by the DCF methodology comports with the evidence regarding the 
outcome of the sale process. The sale process functioned imperfectly as a price discovery tool, 
both during the pre-signing and post-signing phases. Its structure and result are sufficiently 
credible to exclude an outlier valuation for the Company like the one the petitioners advanced, 
but sufficient pricing anomalies [*168]  and dis-incentives to bid existed to create the possibility 
that the sale process permitted an undervaluation of several dollars per share. Financial sponsors 
using an LBO model could not have bid close to $18 per share because of their IRR requirements 
and the Company's inability to support the necessary levels of leverage. Assuming the $17.62 
figure is right, then a strategic acquirer that perceived the Company's value could have gotten the 
Company for what was approximately a 25% discount. Given the massive integration risk 
inherent in such a deal, it is not entirely surprising that HP did not engage and that no one else 
came forward. Had the valuation gap approached what the petitioners' expert believed, then the 
incentives to intervene would have been vastly greater. 
Because it is impossible to quantify the exact degree of the sale process mispricing, this decision 
does not give weight to the Final Merger Consideration. It uses the DCF methodology 




The fair value of the Company on the closing date was $17.62 per share. The legal rate of 
interest, compounded quarterly, shall accrue on this amount from the date of closing [*169]  until 
the date of payment. The parties shall cooperate on preparing a final order for the court. If there 
are additional issues for the court to resolve before a final order can be entered, the parties shall 
submit a joint letter within two weeks that identifies them and recommends a schedule for 
bringing this case to conclusion, at least at the trial court level. 
Footnotes 
• 1  
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My usual practice is to identify individuals by their last names without honorifics. In this 
case, the risk of confusion between Mr. Dell, the biological person, and Dell, the 
corporate person, warrants an exception. The same risk does not exist for others, who are 
identified without honorifics. No disrespect is intended. 
• 2  
See, e.g., JX 155 at 1-3 (UBS Investment Research report noting that 55% of analysts had 
a hold or sell rating on Dell, that the "[t]echnicals [are] ugly," and that investors' concerns 
included "(1) over half of operating profits still come from the deteriorating PC business, 
and (2) skepticism that Dell can become a successful enterprise player"). 
• 3  
Appraisal Rights, supra, at A-31 (citing Onti, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d 904, 907 
(Del. Ch. 1999) (basing fair value calculation on one expert's valuation, "modifying it 
where appropriate by the primary adjustment claims asserted by [the company]"); 
Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, 1995 WL 376911, at *5 
(Del. Ch. June 15, 1995) ("I will not construct my own DCF model. From the evidence 
presented by [the] experts, I will choose the DCF analysis that best represents Silgan's 
value. Next, . . . I will scrutinize that DCF analysis to remove the adversarial hyperbole 
that inevitably influences an expert's opinion in valuation proceedings." (citation 
omitted))). 
• 4  
Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Co., 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 91, 1993 WL 208763, at *8 (Del. 
Ch. June 8, 1993); accord Del. Open MRI Radiology Assocs. P.A. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 
290, 310-11 (Del. Ch. 2006) (Strine, V.C.) ("I cannot shirk my duty to arrive at my own 
independent determination of value, regardless of whether the competing experts have 
provided widely divergent estimates of value, while supposedly using the same well-
established principles of corporate finance."). 
• 5  
Id. at 72. Although Battye is the seminal Delaware Supreme Court case on point, 
Chancellor Josiah Wolcott initially established the meaning of "value" under the 
appraisal statute in Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 172 A. 452 (Del. Ch. 
1934). Because there was a "material variance" between the Delaware appraisal statute, 
which used "value," and the comparable New Jersey statute that served as a model for the 
Delaware statute, which used "full market value," Chancellor Wolcott held the plain 
language of the statute required "value" to be determined on a "going concern basis." Id. 
at 453-54. 
• 6  
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See, e.g., Montgomery Cellular Hldg. Co., Inc. v. Dobler, 880 A.2d 206, 222 (Del. 2005); 
Paskill Corp. v. Alcoma Corp., 747 A.2d 549, 553 (Del. 2000); Rapid-Am. Corp. v. 
Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 802 (Del. 1992); Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 
1144 (Del. 1989); Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 141 (Del. 1980); Universal 
City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 218 (Del. 1975). 
• 7  
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor II), 684 A.2d 289, 298 (Del. 1996) ("[T]he 
dissenter in an appraisal action is entitled to receive a proportionate share of 
fair [*63]  value in the going concern on the date of the merger . . . ."); Universal Studios, 
334 A.2d at 221 (explaining that making a "determination of value as of the day of 
merger [is] the Court's endeavor"). 
• 8  
Technicolor II, 684 A.2d at 298; accord M.G. Bancorp., 737 A.2d at 525 ("[T]he 
corporation must be valued as a going concern based upon the operative reality of the 
company as of the time of the merger." (quotation marks omitted)); Gonsalves v. Straight 
Arrow Publ'rs, Inc. (Gonsalves III), 793 A.2d 312, 316 (Del. Ch. 1998) ("Overall, the 
focus is on the operative reality on the date of the merger." (quotation marks and footnote 
omitted)), aff'd in pertinent part, rev'd on other grounds, 725 A.2d 442 (Del. 1999) 
(TABLE). 
• 9  
See Gonsalves III, 793 A.2d at 326 (noting that the "market value model[ ] . . . may be 
used, in an appropriate situation, to provide a relevant estimate of fair value"); ONTI, 751 
A.2d at 915 (considering stock price by valuing the shares at a discount to that price to 
"factor in this limited market for the shares"); Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Co., 1993 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 91, 1993 WL 208763, at *8 (Del. Ch. June 8, 1993) (determining value of 
shares "primarily based upon an estimated actual market value of the stock"). Relatedly, 
when this court has considered comparable company analyses in valuations, it has relied 
in part upon the market prices of other companies that were found to be similar to the 
company at issue. See, e.g., Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc., 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
125, 2005 WL 2045640, at *18-20 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2005) (Strine, V.C.); Doft & Co. v. 
Travelocity.com Inc., 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, 2004 WL 1152338, at *8 (Del. Ch. May 
20, 2004); Taylor v. Am. Specialty Retailing Gp., Inc., 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, 2003 
WL 21753752, at *9 (Del. Ch. July 25, 2003). 
• 10  
See, e.g., Rapid—Am. Corp., 603 A.2d at 806 ("[T]he Court of Chancery long ago 
rejected exclusive reliance upon market value in an appraisal action."); Kirby Lumber, 
413 A.2d at 141 ("[M]arket value may not be taken as the sole measure of the value of 
the stock."); Del. Racing, 213 A.2d at 211 ("It is, of course, equally axiomatic that market 
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value, either actual or constructed, is not the sole element to be taken into consideration 
in the appraisal [*66]  of stock."); Jacques Coe & Co. v. Minneapolis—Moline Co., 31 
Del. Ch. 368, 75 A.2d 244, 247 (Del. Ch. 1950) (observing that market price should not 
be exclusive measure of value); Munds, 172 A. at 455 ("There are too many accidental 
circumstances entering into the making of market prices to admit them as sure and 
exclusive reflectors of fair value."). 
• 11  
Highfields Capital, Inc. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. Ch. 2007); see also 
M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 796 (Del. 1999) ("A merger price resulting 
from arms-length negotiations where there are no claims of collusion is a very strong 
indication of fair value."); Prescott Gp. Small Cap, L.P. v. Coleman Co., 2004 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 131, 2004 WL 2059515, at *27 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2004) (explaining that "the 
price actually derived from the sale of a company as a whole . . . may be considered as 
long as synergies are excluded"); see also Van de Walle v. Unimation, Inc., 1991 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 27, 1991 WL 29303, at *17 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 1991) (commenting in an entire 
fairness case that "[t]he fact that a transaction [*67]  price was forged in the crucible of 
objective market reality (as distinguished from the unavoidably subjective thought 
process of a valuation expert) is viewed as strong evidence that the price is fair"). 
• 12  
See Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 268, 2015 WL 
6164771 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2015); LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Int'l Corp., 2015 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 177, 2015 WL 4540443 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015); Merlin P'rs LP v. 
AutoInfo, Inc., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 128, 2015 WL 2069417 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015); 
In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 21, 2015 WL 399726 (Del. 
Ch. Jan. 30, 2015); Huff Fund Inv. P'ship v. CKx, Inc., 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 262, 2013 
WL 5878807 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2013). Court of Chancery decisions took the same 
approach before Golden Telecom. See Highfields Capital, 939 A.2d at 59 (deferring to 
the merger price where an arms' length process was conducted, and no material 
impediments prevented another bidder from entering the sale process during an eight-
month market check period); Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P'ship v. Union Fin. Gp., Ltd., 847 
A.2d 340, 358 (Del. Ch. 2003) (Strine, V.C.) (holding that the merger price was the best 
indication of fair value for purposes of an appraisal because the merger "resulted from a 
competitive and fair auction, which followed a more-than-adequate sales process and 
involved broad dissemination of confidential information to a large number of 
prospective buyers"); see also Van de Walle, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 27, 1991 WL 29303, 
at *17 (holding in breach of fiduciary duty case that "[t]he most persuasive evidence of 
the fairness of the . . . merger price is that it was the result of arm's length-negotiations 
between two independent parties, where the seller . . . was motivated to seek the highest 
available price, and a diligent and extensive canvass of the market had confirmed that no 
better price was available"). 
• 13  
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BMC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 268, 2015 WL 6164771, at *18 (finding [*70]  merger price 
to be best indicator of value because of the "uncertainties in the DCF analysis" and 
because there was an "arm's-length transaction negotiated over multiple rounds of 
bidding among interested buyers"); Ramtron, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 177, 2015 WL 
4540443, at *20 (finding merger price to be the most reliable evidence of value after 
deeming management forecasts unreliable and noting that "[a]ny impediments to a higher 
bid resulted from Ramtron's operative reality, not shortcomings of the Merger process"); 
AutoInfo, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 128, 2015 WL 2069417, at *17-18 (deferring to merger 
price after finding projections unreliable in the context of a "competitive and fair 
auction"); Ancestry.com, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 21, 2015 WL 399726, at *23 (finding 
merger price to be best indicator of value because of weak forecasts and a "robust" sale 
process); CKx, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 262, 2013 WL 5878807, at *13 (finding that the 
merger price was the "most reliable indicator of value" in a case "where no comparable 
companies, comparable transactions, or reliable cash flow projections exist"). Unlike the 
current case, none of these decisions involved an MBO. And unlike the current case, 
reliable projections and persuasive evidence of a significant valuation gap did not exist. 
In BMC, the court found that "the sales process was sufficiently structured to develop fair 
value of the Company," which is different than the facts [*71]  of this case. 2015 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 268, 2015 WL 6164771, at *16. All the cases either involved a more active pre-
signing market check or the process was kicked off by an unsolicited third-party bid. 
• 14  
In the Dollar Thrifty litigation, Chief Justice Strine (then a Vice Chancellor) noted that 
the price of Dollar Thrifty, the target company, rose from $26.97 in December 2009 to 
$38.85 in April 2010, with no other fundamental changes in its outlook except for the 
possibility of an M&A deal. In re Dollar Thrifty S'holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 611-12 
(Del. Ch. 2010). He commented that "if the stock market is actually pricing Dollar 
Thrifty on its future expected cash flows, the market has had [*72]  a rather rapidly 
shifting sense of what those future cash flows are." Id. During the fifty-two weeks before 
news of the Merger leaked, the Company's stock price varied within a range which, in 
percentage terms, was more than twice as wide as in Dollar Thrifty, trading between a 
low of $8.86 and a high of $18.32 per share. 
• 15  
Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, Reforming Modern Appraisal Litigation, 41 Del. J. 
Corp. L. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 50), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2712088 [hereinafter Modern 
Appraisal Litigation]; accord James R. Repetti, Management Buyouts, Efficient Markets, 
Fair Value, and Soft Information, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 121, 128-37 (1988) (distinguishing 
between the "first tier" market for shares and the "second tier" market for corporate 
control; collecting studies indicating that the market for control is less efficient than the 
market for shares and that the divergence is pronounced for MBOs; arguing as a result 
that deal price is therefore an unreliable measure of fair value in MBO transactions). 
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• 16  
Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 611 (citing Michael L. Wachter, Takeover Defenses When 
Financial Markets Are (Only) Relatively Efficient, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 787, 792 (2003) 
("Specifically, when financial markets are relatively efficient, while investors cannot 
expect to outperform the market on an ongoing basis, individual stock prices can still be 
incorrect at any point in time—either under- or overestimating the value of the 
corporation." (citing John Y. Campbell, Andrew W. Lo & A. Craig Mackinlay, The 
Econometrics of Financial Markets 24-25 (Princeton Univ. Press, 1997)))); Anabtawi, 
supra, at 1301 ("Stock market prices can depart substantially from their fundamental 
value for extended periods of time."); [*75]  Richard A. Brealey & Stewart C. Meyers, 
Principles Of Corporate Finance 368 (9th ed. 2008) ("[M]ost of the tests of market 
efficiency are concerned with relative prices and focus on whether there are easy profits 
to be made. It is almost impossible to test whether stocks are correctly valued, because no 
one can measure true value with any precision."); Lynn A. Stout, Inefficient Markets and 
the New Finance 7 (Univ. of Cal. L.A., Research Paper No. 05-11, 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=729224 ("[I]n a world of disagreement we must question 
whether securities markets can be efficient in a fundamental value sense. As noted 
earlier, however, fundamental value efficiency is not the only possible understanding of 
efficiency. Many theorists who speak of 'efficient markets' seem to be relying on the 
alternate idea of informational efficiency—that prices respond so quickly to new 
information it is impossible for traders to make profits on the basis of the information. 
Indeed, it has become common for finance economists whose faith in fundamental value-
efficiency has been beaten out of them by market events and the accumulating evidence 
on anomalies to retreat to this intellectual position [Brealey & Meyers (2000, [*76]  p. 
377); Malkiel (1999, p. 270-74)]. It is important to understand that when economists 
define market efficiency in terms of the difficulty of making arbitrage profits, they have 
abandoned the intoxicating and powerful claim that efficient markets produce accurate 
prices. A market can respond near-instantaneously to new information without producing 
prices that mirror fundamental value." (brackets in original)); Lynn A. Stout, The 
Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency, 28 J. Corp. L. 635, 650 (2003) ("[O]nce we 
recognize that the concept of fundamental value efficiency depends not only on the 
[efficient capital market hypothesis] but also on some asset pricing model, most 
commonly CAPM, and that the CAPM itself is premised on investor homogeneity, the 
argument that efficient market prices reflect the best possible estimates of securities' 
future risks and returns is in a shambles. Fundamental value efficiency is a theoretical 
rabbit pulled out of a hypothetical hat."). See generally, e.g., John Cassidy, How Markets 
Fail (2009); Justin Fox, The Myth of the Rational Market (2009). 
• 17  
Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 67, 1988 WL 
53322, at *16 n.17 (Del. Ch. May 19, 1988) (Allen, C.); accord Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 
617 (expressing skepticism about an approach that would require directors to predict the 
future); In re Fort Howard Corp. S'holders Litig., 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 110, 1988 WL 
83147, at *14 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988) (Allen, C.) ("Revlon explicitly recognized that a 
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disinterested board acting in good faith and in an informed manner may enter into lock-
up agreements if the effect was to promote, not impede, shareholder interests. (That can 
only mean if the intended effect is such, for the validity of the agreement itself cannot be 
made to turn upon how accurately the board did foresee the future)."). 
• 18  
See In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 21, 2015 WL 399726, at 
*16 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015) ("Of course, a conclusion that a sale was conducted by 
directors who complied with their duties of loyalty is not dispositive of the question of 
whether that sale generated [*85]  fair value."); In re Appraisal of Orchard Enters., Inc., 
2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 165, 2012 WL 2923305, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2012) (Strine, C.) 
("[T]his is an appraisal action, not a fiduciary duty case, and although I have little reason 
to doubt Orchard's assertion that no buyer was willing to pay Dimensional $25 million 
for the preferred stock and an attractive price for Orchard's common stock in 2009, an 
appraisal must be focused on Orchard's going concern value."). 
• 19  
M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 797 (Del. 1999) ("A fair merger price in 
the context of a breach of fiduciary duty claim will not always be a fair value in the 
context of determining going concern value."); In re Orchard Enters., Inc. S'holder Litig., 
88 A.3d 1, 30 (Del. Ch. 2014) ("A price may fall within the range of fairness for purposes 
of the entire fairness test even though the point calculation demanded by the appraisal 
statute yields an award in excess of the merger price."); Trados II, 73 A.3d at 78 ("A 
court could conclude that a price fell within the range of fairness and would not support 
fiduciary liability, yet still find that the point calculation demanded by the appraisal 
statute yields an award in excess of the merger price."); Reis, 28 A.3d at 466 ("A court 
readily could conclude that a price fell within the range of fairness and would not support 
fiduciary liability, and yet the point calculation demanded by the appraisal statute could 
yield an award in excess of the merger price."). [*86]  Compare Cinerama, Inc. v. 
Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1176-77 (Del. 1995) (affirming that merger 
consideration of $23 per share was entirely fair), with Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 
884 A.2d 26, 30 (Del. 2005) (awarding fair value in appraisal of $28.41 per share). 
• 20  
In Delaware, seminal cases addressing challenges to MBOs on fiduciary grounds include 
the Delaware Supreme Court's decisions in Revlon and Macmillan and Chancellor Allen's 
decisions in Fort Howard and RJR Nabisco. See Mills Acq. Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 
A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hldgs., Inc., 506 A.2d 
173 (Del. 1986); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S'holders Litig., 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, 1989 
WL 7036 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989); In re Fort Howard Corp. S'holders Litig., 1988 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 110, 1988 WL 83147 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988). More recent treatments 
include a series of opinions authored by Chief Justice Strine while [*87]  serving as a 
member of this court. See In re Lear Corp. S'holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94 (Del. Ch. 2007); 
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In re Topps Co. S'holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. 
S'holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171 (Del. Ch. 2007). This court's rejection of a settlement in 
SS&C Technologies likewise identifies some of the complications raised by an MBO. 
See In re SS&C Techs., Inc., 911 A.2d 816, 820-22 (Del. Ch. 2006) (rejecting as 
inadequate a proposed settlement of breach of fiduciary duty claims challenging an 
MBO; identifying issues that plaintiffs' counsel failed to address adequately). 
• 21  
A number of authorities are cited in this decision. There are many others. See, e.g., Tom 
Ablum & Mary Beth Burgis, Leveraged Buyouts: The Ever Changing Landscape, 13 
DePaul Bus. L.J. 109 (2001); William T. Allen, Independent Directors In MBO 
Transactions: Are They Fact or Fantasy?, 45 Bus. Law. 2055 (1990); Jason M. Klein, 
When the Board Should Just Say Yes to Management: The Interplay Between the 
Decision of Whether to Conduct an Auction and Transaction Structure, 5 Stan. J.L. Bus. 
& Fin. 45 (1999); Louis Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 730 
(1985); Dale Arthur Oesterle & Jon R. Norberg, Management Buyouts: Creating or 
Appropriating Shareholder Wealth, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 207 (1988); Bill Shaw, Resolving 
the Conflict of Interest in Management Buyouts, 19 Hofstra L. Rev. 143 (1990); David B. 
Simpson, The Management Buyout: An Idea Whose Time May Have Passed, 17 Seton 
Hall Legis. J. 137 (1993). 
• 22  
The economic literature on stockholder returns in MBOs through 2011 is surveyed 
helpfully in Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Form [*88]  Over Substance? The 
Value of Corporate Process and Management Buy-Outs, 36 Del. J. Corp. L. 849, 867-71 
(2011). Cain and Davidoff also provide empirical evidence of their own. 
• 23  
Compare Yakov Amihud, Leveraged Management Buyouts and Shareholders' Wealth, in 
Leveraged Management Buyouts: Causes and Consequences 3, 24 (Yakov Amihud ed., 
1989) (concluding that MBOs increase shareholders' wealth by increasing stock prices), 
with Robert L. Kieschnick, Jr., Management Buyouts of Public Corporations: An 
Analysis of Prior Characteristics, in Leveraged Management Buyouts: Causes and 
Consequences 35, 57 (Yakov Amihud ed., 1989) (concluding that the benefit of MBOs 
cannot be established), with Kai Chen, Yong-Cheol Kim & Richard D. Marcus, Hands in 
the Cookie Jar? The Case of Management Buyouts 28 (2009) (finding evidence that 
management acts opportunistically in MBOs but that effect is mitigated by option 
holdings), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1364655, published in 3 Int'l Rev. Acct., 
Banking & Fin. 19 (2011). 
• 24  
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See Joshua Rosenbaum & Joshua Pearl, Investment Banking: Valuation, Leveraged 
Buyouts, and Mergers & Acquisitions 195-96 (2009) ("[An LBO model] is used . . . to 
determine an implied valuation range for a given target in a potential LBO sale based on 
achieving acceptable returns. . . ."). 
• 25  
Id. at 235-36 ("Traditionally, the valuation implied by LBO analysis is toward the lower 
end of a comprehensive analysis when compared to other methodologies, particularly 
precedent transactions and DCF analysis. This is largely due to the constraints 
imposed [*92]  by an LBO, including leverage capacity, credit market conditions, and the 
sponsor's own IRR hurdles.") 
• 26  
Rosenbaum & Pearl, supra, at 195-96 ("In an M&A sell-side advisory context, the banker 
conducts LBO analysis to assess valuation from the perspective of a financial sponsor. 
This provides the ability to set sale price expectations for the seller and guide 
negotiations with buyers accordingly. . . ." (emphasis added)). 
• 27  
Tr. 751: (Rajkovic) ("Q. So among the big boys in private equity, and I know you don't 
want to hear this, they basically have the same models, the same hurdle rates, the same 
returns and, in fact, often the same clients. Correct? A. They come fairly close unless - 
they come fairly [*96]  close in most situations. Yes they do."); Tr. 749-50 (Rajkovic) 
("Q. And you guys have a lot of experience with LBOs there at JPMorgan. Right? A. We 
do. Q. And you know what kind of IRRs these firms try to achieve. Right? A. We do. Q. 
And you know the time frame at which they try to get out. Correct? A. We do. Q. And 
you know the leverage that they try to put on, both their ability to get the amount of 
leverage but also the amount of leverage they need to get certain returns. Correct? A. 
Yes. Q. And you took all that into account, and you said based on the September 21 most 
current management forecasts, with no inversions, that the implied maximum price to pay 
would be $14.13 in an LBO. Right? . . . A. Yes. Correct. Q. Okay. And so you basically 
told the board, 'Look, in an LBO, don't expect anything that's going to come in above 
that.' Right? A. We told them that using this model and with the assumptions around 
leverage and return, that is what value the model would indicate . . . ."); Rajkovic Dep. 
108 ("Q. This isn't Michael Dell or Silver Lake[] specific? A. Just for anybody. . . ."). 
• 28  
JX 229 at 60. Academic scholarship suggests this is true of private equity deals more 
broadly. [*100]  See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private 
Equity, 23 J. Econ. Perspectives 121, 122 (2009) ("[T]here is also evidence consistent 
with private equity investors taking advantage of market timing (and market mispricing) 
between debt and equity markets particularly in the public-to-private transactions of the 
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last 15 years."); id. at 136 ("[P]rivate equity firms pay lower premiums than public 
company buyers in cash acquisitions. These findings are consistent with private equity 
firms identifying companies or industries that turn out to be undervalued. Alternatively, 
this could indicate that private equity firms are particularly good negotiators, and/or that 
target boards and management do not get the best possible price in these acquisitions."); 
id. at 135-36 ("[P]ost-1980s public-to-private transactions experience only modest 
increases in firm operating performance, but still generate large financial returns to 
private equity funds. This finding suggests that private equity firms are able to buy low 
and sell high."). 
• 29  
See Cain & Davidoff, supra, at 862 ("There is a more concrete argument against MBOs 
on fairness grounds. It is the prospect that management is utilizing inside information 
when it arranges an MBO. Management by its [*103]  inherent position has in its 
possession non-public knowledge of the corporation, and management can use this 
informational asymmetry between itself and public shareholders to time the buy-out 
process. MBOs can thus be arranged at advantageous times in the business cycle or 
history of the corporation." (footnotes omitted)); Marcel Canoy, Yohanes E. Riyanto & 
Patrick van Cayseele, Corporate Takeovers, Bargaining and Managers' Incentives to 
Invest, 21 Managerial & Decision Econs. 1, 2, 14 (2000) ("Long-term investments, such 
as R&D investments, are slow yielding and more difficult to be evaluated by the market, 
despite the fact that they could generate higher profits. Consequently, firms investing 
heavily in long-term projects may be more susceptible to a takeover attempt. . . . If being 
taken over is better than taking over [for target management] . . . then obviously, 
[management] would like to overinvest to facilitate a takeover . . . ."); Deborah A. 
DeMott, Directors' Duties in Management Buyouts and Leveraged Recapitalizations, 49 
Ohio St. L.J. 517, 536 (1988) (explaining that overhang from past acquisitions may 
artificially depress a company's stock market price and make the buyout price appear 
generous); Repetti, supra, at 125 ("Other [*104]  methods for management to realize 
large gains in management buyouts are not as innocuous as the use of leverage or as 
apparently innocuous as increasing cash flow. Management may actively depress the 
price of the shares prior to the management buyout in order to reduce the price they have 
to pay. Management may accomplish this by . . . channeling investments into long-term 
projects which will not provide short-term returns."); James Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of 
the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1189, 1202-03 (1964) 
("Far more difficult is ensuring to departing stockholders the benefit of improved 
prospects, where, at the time of appraisal, the evidence of improvement is more intuitive 
than tangible. . . . The appraisal process will tend to produce conservative results where 
the values are speculative, and the majority's power to pick the time at which to trigger 
appraisal may encourage them to move when full values may be temporarily obscured." 
(footnote omitted)); see also Benjamin Hermalin & Alan Schwartz, Buyouts in Large 
Companies, 25 J. Legal Stud. 351, 356 (1996) ("With respect to timing, the firm could 
initiate a freeze-out (i) before it invests effort, (ii) after it invests effort but before the 
value of the firm conditional [*105]  on effort is revealed, or (iii) after the value of the 
firm is revealed but before earnings are realized. We generally assume that the firm 
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would wait until point iii because waiting in the model is costless but produces gains: 
were the firm to initiate a freeze-out before it learns its value, it might have to pay too 
much."). 
• 30  
David A. Lax & James K. Sebenius, 3-D Negotiation: Powerful Tools to Change in Your 
Most Important Deals 189 (2006) ("[I]n [the] auction setting, higher anchors—in the 
form of minimum bid prices—tend to increase the valuation bidders place on the 
objection [*106]  being auctioned."); G. Richard Shell, Bargaining For Advantage 159 
(1999) (explaining that the "anchor and adjustment effect . . . refers to a human tendency 
to be affected by 'first impression' numbers thrown into our field of vision [and] [w]e tend 
to make adjustments from these often arbitrary reference points"); Guhan Subramanian, 
Negotiauctions 16-18 (2010) (explaining that anchoring "works by influencing your 
perceptions of where the [zone of possible agreement] lies"). 
• 31  
Malcom Baker, Xin Pan, & Jeffery Wurgler, The Effect of Reference Point Prices on 
Mergers and Acquisitions, 106 J. Fin. Econ. 49, 50 (2012) (finding the "26-week high 
price [of a particular stock] has a statistically and economically significant effect on offer 
prices [in mergers and acquisitions], and the 39-, 52-, and 65-week high prices also have 
independent explanatory power" and speculating as to the causes of this reference point 
effect); id. at 64-65 (finding that deals with higher premiums tend to close more often, 
which is "consistent with reference point behavior."); Inga Chira & Jeff Madura, 
Reference Point Theory and Pursuit of Deals, 50 Fin. Rev. 275, 277, 299 (2015) ("Our 
analysis reveals that a higher target 52-week [*107]  reference point, relative to the 
target's current stock price, . . . increases the likelihood of a management buyout (MBO). 
. . . Overall, the results from our analyses offer strong evidence that target and bidder 
reference points serve as potent anchors that shape the outcomes and structures of 
mergers."); Sangwon Lee & Vijay Yerramilli, Relative Values, Announcement Timing, 
and Shareholder Returns in Mergers and Acquisitions 2 (January 2016) (unpublished 
manuscript) (adopting finding of Baker, Pan, & Wurger, supra, that "key decision makers 
in the bidding and target firms and investors are likely to use recent prices as reference 
points"). 
• 32  
See Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can 
Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also 
Act and Think Long Term?, 66 Bus. Law. 1, 10 (2010) (noting that institutional investors 
"control nearly 70 percent of U.S. publicly traded equities" and [f]or a variety of reasons, 
these institutional investors often have a myopic concern for short-term performance"); 
see also Martin Lipton, Empiricism and Experience; Activism and Short-Termism; the 




short-termism-the-real-world-of-business/ (collecting [*108]  studies supporting view 
that investors exert short-term pressures on corporations). 
• 33  
See Martin Lipton & Marshall P. Shaffer, Wachtell Lipton Discusses Short-Term 
Investors, Long-Term Investments, and Firm Value, Colum. L. Sch. Blue Sky Blog (Feb. 
3, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/02/03/wachtell-lipton-discussesshort-
term-investors-long-term-investments-and-firm-value/ (commenting on study suggesting 
that investors undervalue R&D investments and concluding that "short-term investors 
possess the undue ability to pressure companies into maximizing near-term gains at the 
expense of long-term growth"). 
• 34  
See, e.g., In re Dole Food Co., Inc. S'holder Litig., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 223, 2015 WL 
5052214, at *27 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2015) (finding [*110]  that defendant fiduciaries 
engaged in "a calculated effort to depress the market price" as part of a plan to take the 
company private (quotation marks omitted)); In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders 
Litig., 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, 2004 WL 1305745, at *32 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) 
("Because ECM's stock price was depressed, Prosser abandoned that proposal at the 
eleventh hour and 'flipped' the deal for his sole personal benefit to take advantage of the 
temporarily and artificially depressed stock price. That stock price then became the 'floor' 
for the equally depressed and unfair Privatization price . . . ."); Sealy Mattress Co. of N.J. 
v. Sealy, Inc., 532 A.2d 1324, 1336 (Del. Ch. 1987) (finding the defendants engaged in a 
"calculated effort to depress the price of Sealy until the minority stockholders were 
eliminated by merger or some other form of acquisition" and that "[s]uch behavior by a 
majority stockholder constitutes unfair dealing"). 
• 35  
Tr. 366 (Hiltz) ("[T]he mathematical chances of producing a higher bid [were] low based 
on the history of go-shops"); JX 301 at 19 (Evercore advising the Committee that "[s]ince 
2005, there have been 137 transactions with equity values greater than $100 million with 
go-shop provisions" and that of those transactions, "only 16 or 12% resulted in a superior 
offer"); see Guhan Subramanian, Go-Shops vs. No-Shops in Private Equity: Deals 
Evidence [*117]  & Implications, 63 Bus. Law. 729, 750-51 (2008) [hereinafter Go-
Shops vs. No-Shops] (finding that there is "no post-signing competition in go-shop 
MBOs during my sample period, consistent with practitioner wisdom that MBOs give 
incumbent managers a significant advantage over other potential buyers"); Brian JM 
Quinn, Omnicare: Coercion and the New Unocal Standard, 38 J. Corp. L. 835, 844 
(2013) [hereinafter New Unocal Standard] ("A more pessimistic interpretation of the 
widespread adoption of go-shop provisions is that go-shop provisions are not truly 
effective at generating post-signing competition and that buyers understand as much."); J. 
Russel Denton, Note, Stacked Deck: Go-Shops and Auction Theory, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 
1529, 1549 (2008) ("[A]uction theory does suggest that target boards of directors should 
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push for conducting a true pre-signing auction rather than quickly signing a deal 
containing a go-shop granting the initial buyer information rights, a termination fee, 
expense reimbursement, and matching rights. This is especially true for companies that 
are selling themselves to financial buyers, since go-shops have structures that discourage 
bidding wars between financial buyers."); see also Steven Davidoff Solomon, Flawed 
Bidding Process Leaves Dell at a Loss, N.Y. Times (Apr. [*118]  23, 2013) at 2 (citing 
FactSet MergerMetrics showing that "[s]ince 2004, there have been 196 transactions with 
go-shops . . . . [i]n only 6.6 percent of these did another bidder compete during the go-
shop period"). 
In his expert report for this case, Subramanian updated his empirical study from 2008. 
The original study identified six go-shops for MBOs, and found that none led to a 
superior offer. Go-Shops vs. No-Shops, supra, at 750. Since then, there have been two 
MBOs with go-shops. Both produced superior bids. See JX 909 TR 66-67. Subramanian 
distinguished both cases, noting that management was not key in either situation, and 
stood by his opinion that go-shops are generally ineffective in MBOs. 
• 36  
See Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 840 n.5 (noting "the importance of the pre-signing phase to 
developing price competition among private equity bidders"). Renowned M&A 
practitioner Marty Lipton has contrasted the effects of adding another interested party at 
the front end of a deal negotiation with the effect of bargaining more vigorously with a 
single counterparty at the back end of the process. Lipton even roughly quantified the 
added value of adding a competing negotiator relative to greater negotiating skill in the 
initial two-party deal: "The ability to bring somebody [*119]  into a situation is far more 
important than the extra dollar a share at the back end. At the front end, you're probably 
talking about 50%. At the back end, you're talking about 1 or 2 percent." Guhan 
Subramanian, The Drivers of Market Efficiency in Revlon Transactions, 28 J. Corp. L. 
691, 691 (2003) (quoting Author's Interview with Martin Lipton, Senior Partner, 
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, in New York, NY (June 14, 2000)). 
• 37  
Go-Shops vs. No-Shops, supra, at 753 (arguing from sample transactions that because of 
the prospect of post-signing competition, pure go-shop transactions result in higher sales 
prices than single-bidder negotiations); see New Unocal Standard, supra, at 844 
("Knowing that a transaction will include a go-shop, wherein the seller will treat the 
initial bidder as a stalking horse to generate an active post-signing auction, may incent 
initial bidders to offer a preemptive bid to deter subsequent bids. In that view, the 
prospect of competition, even if no competition subsequently emerges, should be 
sufficient incentive for a bidder to shift transaction surplus to the seller."); Brian JM 
Quinn, Bulletproof Mandatory Rules for Deal Protection, 32 J. Corp. L. 865, 879-80 
(2007) [hereinafter Bulletproof] (surveying literature on auction theory and concluding 
that "[t]he two key insights are that competition, [*120]  or the threat of competition, will 
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lead to a price closer to the buyer's reservation price and that the price effect of one 
additional competitor is greater than the price effects attributable to bargaining"). 
• 38  
Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 615. See Nihat Aktas et al., Negotiations Under the Threat of 
Auction, 98 J. Fin. Econ. 241, 242 (2010) ("Our empirical results confirm the existence 
of latent competition on acquirers' bidding in one-on-one negotiations: More potential 
competitors are associated with higher bids."); John C. Easterwood et al., Controlling the 
Conflict of Interest in Management Buyouts, 76 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 512, 513 (1994) 
(recognizing that "[b]oth actual and potential competing offers could limit the ability of 
managers to underbid" in MBOs); id. at 515 (analyzing sample of transactions and 
finding that "implicit outside competition is not associated with higher abnormal returns 
compared to the returns experienced by stockholders of [MBOs] involving no 
competition whatsoever"); id. at 520 (concluding that "explicit competition from outside 
bidders is more effective than implicit competition"). 
• 39  
In re Lear Corp. S'holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 121 (Del. Ch. 2007) (Strine, V.C.). 
Consistent with the professional culture of not topping other firms' deals, Silver Lake, 
KKR, Blackstone, and TPG [*121]  were among the sponsors who settled a lawsuit 
alleging they and other private equity firms conspired to fix prices in LBOs. See Henry 
Sender, KKR, Blackstone and TPG Pay $325m to Settle Collusion Lawsuit, Fin. Times 
(Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0cee0c66-1e3e-11e4-bb68-
00144feabdc0.html . Evidence from the suit included an email from the co-head of US 
buyouts at Carlyle, who allegedly wrote "KKR asked the industry to step down on HCA 
[Holdings Inc.]!" Id. KKR later withdrew and allegedly told Blackstone it was "standing 
down because [it] would not jump a signed deal of [Blackstone's]." Id. Blackstone 
allegedly responded that "[t]ogether, we can be unstoppable, but in opposition, we can 
cost each other a lot of money." Id. 
Andrew Ross Sorkin of the New York Times made a similar point about Blackstone's 
involvement in the Company's go-shop, which Mandl described as "a pretty thoughtful 
commentary." JX 448 at 1. Sorkin wrote, 
The real question is why, despite the $25 million reimbursement guarantee, 
Blackstone is risking its reputation to even contemplate a deal for Dell. 
If Blackstone makes a formal bid . . . it will most likely be competing against a 
bid from Mr. Dell. While Blackstone has clearly been invited into the auction 
process, if Mr. Dell quits [*122]  or is ousted as a result of a winning bid from 
Blackstone, the firm will appear to have made a hostile bid. Private equity firms 
have spent the last 25 years avoiding anything that could make them perceived as 




JX 446 at 3 (Andrew Ross Sorkin, A $25 Million Question Over A Bid For Dell, N.Y. 
imes (Apr. 1, 2013)). 
• 40  
See Aktas et al., supra, at 242; Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, Why Do Sellers 
(Usually) Prefer Auctions", 99 Am. Econ. Rev. 1544, 1568 (2009). 
• 41  
A matching right is the functional equivalent of a right of first refusal, and scholars have 
analyzed them as [*136]  such. See Bulletproof, supra, at 870 ("The presence of rights of 
first refusal can be a strong deterrent against subsequent bids and is therefore a 
potentially potent protective measure in the non-Revlon context. . . . Success under these 
circumstances may involve paying too much and suffering the "winner's curse.'"); see 
also Frank Aquila & Melissa Sawyer, Diary Of A Wary Market: 2010 In Review And 
What To Expect In 2011, 14 M & A Law. Nov.-Dec. 2010, at 1 ("Match rights can result 
in the first bidder "nickel bidding' to match an interloper's offer, with repetitive rounds of 
incremental increases in the offer price. Targets and buyers are starting to question 
whether this dynamic produces the best results. One alternative would be for the initial 
bidder to make a sizeable topping bid instead of a matching bid, but demand a higher 
break fee as the quid pro quo. if [sic] the bidder, as part of that package, announces that it 
is making its "best and final bid,' then the target may conclude there is no justification for 
granting continuing match rights as part of the package. In addition, targets are starting to 
question whether it makes sense for initial bidders to have match rights when the merger 
agreement [*137]  contains an explicit go-shop. Few go-shops are successful as it is . . . 
and match rights are just one more factor that may dissuade a potential competing bidder 
from stepping in the middle of an already-announced transaction."); Marcel Kahan & 
Rangarajan K. Sundaram, First-Purchase Rights: Rights of First Refusal and Rights of 
First Offer, 14 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 331, 331 (2012) (finding "that a right of first refusal 
transfers value from other buyers to the right-holder, but may also force the seller to 
make suboptimal offers"); David I. Walker, Rethinking Rights of First Refusal, 5 Stan. 
J.L. Bus. & Fin. 1, 20-21 (1999) (discussing how a right of first refusal affects bidders); 
cf. Steven J. Brams & Joshua R. Mitts, Mechanism Design in M&A Auctions, 38 Del. J. 
Corp. L. 873, 879 (2014) ("The potential for a bidding war remains unless interlopers are 
restricted-say, to one topping bid, which then can be matched."). Unlimited matching 
rights have a particularly strong deterrent effect on financial sponsors. Brian JM Quinn, 
Re-Evaluating the Emerging Standard of Review for Matching Rights in Control 
Transactions, 36 Del. J. Corp. L. 1011, 1027-28 (2011) ("[T]he presence of a matching 
right in the hands of an initial common value bidder will deter other common value 
bidders from making bids. Financial [*138]  buyers have a well-known aversion for 
engaging in bidding contests. Consequently, it appears that the threat of the winner's 
curse is at least implicitly understood by market participants. Finally, the direct effect of 
the matching rights in the context of a common value auction is to appropriate transaction 
gains from the seller to the right-holder. Because other market participants are hesitant to 
offer topping bids in the common value context, this permits the right-holder to offer 
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low-ball bids and thereby extract transaction surplus at the expense of selling 
shareholders. . . . The common value bidder is able to create private value by offering a 
bid lower than its full valuation of the seller." (footnotes omitted)). Evercore advised the 
Committee that "[m]atching rights, unless limited, serve to discourage bidders and should 
be avoided." JX 266 at 35. 
• 42  
Mr. Dell's relationships with customers may have been one of the sources of his value. 
During the go-shop process, a news [*143]  report suggested that Blackstone was vetting 
candidates to replace Mr. Dell. After reading the account, Mr. Dell sent an email to 
Blackstone, which stated: This evening I was having dinner with a potential customer 
worth over $600 million in revenue to our company. They were reacting quite negatively 
to the story and others like it. The customer was suggesting ways to contractually protect 
themselves from the risk associated with . . . the kinds of changes suggested in press 
speculation. I am disappointed by the real damage[] stories like this and others are 
inflicting on our business. JX 449 at 1. The email suggests that customers valued Mr. 
Dell's involvement and would take their business elsewhere if he left. 
• 43  
This calculation assumes that the amount of debt financing increased proportionately. If 
the [*145]  debt level remained constant and all of the price increase had to be funded 
with equity, then each $1 increase in the deal price would cost Mr. Dell more than $1 
billion. Tr. 794-96 (Subramanian). 44 Cf. J.Crew Group Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement 
(Schedule 14A) 91 (Jan. 25, 2011) (noting cooperation agreement with CEO/Chairman 
that included promise to: "[1] participat[e] in meetings, presentations, due diligence 
sessions and other sessions with persons interested in making a takeover proposal; [2] 
assist[] in the preparation of solicitation materials, offering documents and similar 
documents to be used in connection with such efforts; and [3] cooperat[e] and assist[] in 
obtaining any consents, waivers, approvals and authorizations for and in connection with 
any takeover proposal"). 
• 44  
Cf. J.Crew Group Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 91 (Jan. 25, 2011) 
(noting cooperation agreement with CEO/Chairman that included promise to: "[1] 
participat[e] in meetings, presentations, due diligence sessions and other sessions with 
persons interested in making a takeover proposal; [2] assist[] in the preparation of 
solicitation materials, offering documents and similar documents to be used in connection 
with such efforts; and [3] cooperat[e] and assist[] in obtaining any consents, waivers, 
approvals and authorizations for and in connection with any takeover proposal"). 
• 45  
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E.g., Cede & Co. v. JRC Acq. Corp., 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 12, 2004 WL 286963, at *2 
(Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2004 ("[T]his Court prefers valuations based on management 
projections available as of the date of the merger and holds a healthy skepticism for post-
merger adjustments to management projections or the creation of new projections 
entirely."); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 146, 2003 WL 
23700218, at *7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2003) ("Contemporary pre-merger management 
projections are particularly useful in the appraisal context because management 
projections, by definition, are not tainted by post-merger hindsight and [*154]  are 
usually created by an impartial body. In stark contrast, post hoc, litigation-driven 
forecasts have an 'untenably high' probability of containing 'hindsight bias and other 
cognitive distortions.'" (quoting Agranoff v. Miller, 791 A.2d 880, 892 (Del. Ch. 2001))), 
aff'd in pertinent part, rev'd in part, 875 A.2d 602 (Del. 2005). 
• 46  
See Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 62 (Del. Ch. 2007) 
(adopting reasonable updates to management projections); Andaloro, 2005 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 125, 2005 WL 2045640, at *11 (adjusting management forecasts to exclude 
revenue from division deemed likely to be sold); In re U.S. Cellular Operating Co., 2005 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 1, 2005 WL 43994, at *11-15, *19 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 2005) (building 
projections based on expert-created forecasts and finding DCF most reliable evidence of 
value). 
• 47  
Tr. 331-332 (Sweet) (testifying that at the time of the Merger, the Company had 
opportunities for overseas growth and planned to increase its presence in the BRIC 
countries, the Asia Pacific region, and other emerging markets); JX 161 at 20 
(management presentation noting plans to "[capitalize on the shift of geographic wealth 
to emerging countries"); JX 534 at 2 (proxy statement noting that "following the merger, 
the Company will make significant investments to enhance its presence and ability to 
compete in emerging markets, including the BRIC countries . . . [and will] expand 
aggressively in other parts of Asia, Latin and South America, Central and Eastern 
Europe, the Middle East and Africa"). 
• 48  
See Paskill Corp. v. Alcoma Corp., 747 A.2d 549, 552 (Del. 2000) ("[T]the Court of 
Chancery should [*160]  have excluded any deduction for the speculative future tax 
liabilities"); Ng v. Heng Sang Realty Corp., 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 69, 2004 WL 885590, 
at *6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 22, 2004) (HN28  "In determining fair value, this Court cannot 
consider speculative tax liabilities."), aff'd, 867 A.2d 901 (Del. 2005) (TABLE). 
• 49  
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In re AT&T Mobility Wireless Operations Hldgs. Appraisal Litig., 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
201, 2013 WL 3865099, at *4 (Del. Ch. Jun. 24, 2013) (adopting effective tax rate that 
was "[c]onsistent with the Companies' operative reality"). For decisions using the 
effective tax rate rather than the marginal tax rate, see Owen v. Cannon, 2015 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 165, 2015 WL 3819204, at *24 (Del. Ch. June 17, 2015) (adopting 22.71% tax 
rate); Golden Telecom I, 993 A.2d at 513 (adopting 31.6% tax rate based on predictions 
of management and company's historical tax rate), aff'd, 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010); Del. 
Open MRI., 898 A.2d at 330 (adopting 29.4% tax rate); Ng, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 69, 
2004 WL 885590, at *6 (adopting 11% tax rate), aff'd, 867 A.2d 901 (Del. (TABLE) 
("[I]t appears to the Court that the Court of Chancery's factual determination as to the 
appropriate tax rate to apply to projected future earnings in a discounted cash flow 
valuation was supported by the record."). But see In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., 
2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 21, 2015 WL 399726, at *20 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015) (holding that 
it was "overly speculative to apply the current tax rate in perpetuity . . . '[b]ecause of the 
transitory nature of tax deductions and credits'" (quoting Henke v. Trilithic Inc., 2005 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 170, 2005 WL 2899677, at *9 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2005))). 
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